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Colombia, Medellin, Antioquia: A soldier stands amongst the remains of a community of displaced families razed to the 
ground the previous night in a fire. Families displaced by the violence and conflict more often than not find themselves living in 
areas where they are exposed to landslides and their wooden homes to fires. Photographer: Paul Smith/Panos. 
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Foreword 
by Robert Muggah 
It is exceedingly difficult to ascertain where and why cities will falter and fail in the twenty-first 
century. It may be even harder to determine those cities that are likely to thrive and survive. 
However, one fact is beyond dispute: unprecedented urbanisation will play a fundamental 
role in determining their success or failure. The thrust of city growth is in the South and the 
East, with most future population expansion in the coming decades to occur in Africa and 
Asia. Just three countries – China, India and Nigeria – will account for 40 per cent of global 
population growth in the next decade. Profits, power and people are concentrated in and 
between metropolitan areas. 
The speed and scale of the urban revolution is breathtaking. Just 3 per cent of the world´s 
population lived in cities in the early 1800s compared to more than 50 per cent today. There 
are currently more than 50,000 cities around the world, home to more than 3 billion people. 
Just 600 of them account for more than two thirds of global gross domestic product (GDP). 
Among the latter are 28 mega-cities housing one fifth of humanity. Yet the bulk of future 
urbanisation will take place in small- and medium-sized cities in low- and medium-income 
settings. The world´s slum population will expand from 1 billion to 2 billion people by 2040. 
There are tremendous opportunities in these fast-growing settings – but also unsettling risks. 
Cities are re-emerging as critical referents in international relations. They have always 
served as the anchors of nation states. And cities are again acting as key nodes of global 
governance, channelling ideas, capital and labour. Policymakers and scholars alike are 
converging on the city to understand the character and trajectory of fragility and resilience. 
They are busily distilling the many external and internal risks that influence the onset, 
intensity and duration of violence in the city. Many are convinced that security and 
development is mediated at the metropolitan, even the neighbourhood, scale. The legitimacy 
of violence and those who exert it is hyper-local and determined on city streets. 
The global turn to the city is capturing the attention of diplomats, development experts and 
defence specialists. Digital and street-level protests are playing out in the central squares 
and peripheries of Middle Eastern, North African, Western European, North and Latin 
American capital cities. The projected impacts of the freshly minted Sustainable 
Development Goals depend fundamentally on the fortunes of the world´s cities. Future 
stability and humanitarian interventions in response to wars are being planned with cities in 
mind. Across it all, global technology and infrastructure firms are salivating at the prospects 
of smart cities and vast concrete conurbations. 
There are no simple solutions to achieving security and safety in cities. On the one hand, city 
living is typically correlated with longer life expectancy, improved health, higher education, 
and greater prosperity compared to rural life. Yet cities also commonly reproduce an array of 
risks and stresses – real and perceived. While expressing forms of resilience, living 
conditions in some of the world´s slums can be appalling. Ultimately, cities are exceedingly 
diverse and complex ecosystems. They exhibit overlapping spatial, institutional and material 
characteristics that benefit a narrow bandwidth of residents while excluding others. The lines 
dividing inner cities, suburbs, peripheries and slums are increasingly blurred. 
Urban authorities – both public and private – are in the business of imposing order. In some 
cases this may be a means to an end – the securing of property rights and the promotion of 
growth. In other cases order is the end, driving growth models that benefit the elite at the 
expense of the majority. To exert the rule of law, norms are enforced, force is deployed and 
the built environment reshaped. Lawful rule is rarely evenly applied or experienced. Instead, 
it is projected onto highly stratified and dynamic societies segmented by politics, identity and 
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class. Where cities are unable to provide rudimentary core functions, including security, they 
are fragile. Violence may be exerted as a form of repression from above, or as resistance to 
the projection of power from below. 
There is, of course, no such thing as a perfectly resilient or a completely failed city. All cities 
irrespective of their location exhibit properties of fragility and resilience. The prevalence of 
fragility emerges where risks and stresses accumulate, undermine services and expose 
citizens to chronic and acute vulnerability. Cities become more resilient when their formal 
and informal institutions are able to cope and adapt to risks and stresses, and rebound to a 
new and improved equilibrium. The ways in which fragility and resilience are expressed 
varies across space, time and demography. 
Cities are at the centre of complex governance systems. Their ability to exit fragility and 
become more resilient is conditioned by international factors, but also the interplay of federal, 
state and municipal institutions. Some national institutions are more hostile to cities than 
others. The institutional and financial power of local governments may be stronger in the 
Americas and Europe than, say, in Africa and Asia. Ultimately, the way cities are governed, 
and the power constellations that produce their social contracts, influences the extent of 
fragility and resilience. In all cities there is an element of hybridity in the forging and 
sustaining of political pacts and settlements. 
Throughout it all, urban authorities are in a constant process of enabling and managing 
complex services, including public security and safety. Just as the spectrum of threats they 
face is expanding, so too are the tools and methods available to address them. Many city 
leaders and societies are investing in urban upgrading, community-based models of policing, 
and new technologies to impose order. In some instances their efforts exacerbate insecurity, 
while in others they are credited with significantly reducing homicide, violent crime and fear. 
Where security provision is seen as illegitimate and inadequate, alternative providers – state 
and non-state – emerge. The privatisation of security in cities is now routine. The notion of 
security as a public good is fading: in many parts of the world it never existed at all. 
Throughout it all, cities are increasingly central arbitrators of politics, economics and social 
affairs. In upper-, medium- and lower-income settings, ‘city-zens’ are asserting their rights to 
the city and exploring new forms of networked cooperation and collaboration that transcend 
national borders. Cities from the so-called ‘North’ and ‘South’ are co-designing and 
experimenting with ways to address climate change, diminish exposure to terrorism, and 
prevent and reduce overlapping forms of inter-personal and collective violence. Many of 
them are struggling to manage multiple violence entrepreneurs who, while operating at a 
hyper-local scale, may also benefit from political economies that transcend city and national 
borders. Such groups can and often do re-order institutions and social relations for better and 
for ill. 
The Cities, Violence and Order (CVO) initiative offers a critical exploration of the future of 
urban spaces. Informed by Foresight methods, the project considers cities at the interface of 
power, economics, environmental change, but also the ways in which populations access 
services, apply new technologies and attach meaning to where they live. The editors caution 
against ‘predicting’ the future and over-simplifying, unintentionally stigmatising and overtly 
securitising urban spaces. And their focus is not isolated to mature developed cities like 
Barcelona, London, New York or Tokyo but rather fast-growing metropolises such as 
Bosaso, Karachi, Mumbai and Rio de Janeiro. These semi-planned cities are a kind of new 
normal and rarely conform to the historical patterns of slower-growing counterparts in North 
America and Europe. It is only by learning from them and coming to terms with our many 
blind spots that we are likely to make inroads towards reducing fragility and maximising city 
resilience in the next three decades. 
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Executive summary 
How will security in cities be understood in the future? For whom will it be provided? 
What are the ways by which urban security provision will be governed? And, what 
impact will violence and order in cities have on the processes of state-building in 
fragile contexts in the future? These questions are uppermost in the minds of 
policymakers and academics. A growing body of evidence underlines the heterogeneity of 
security processes and outcomes, both within and between cities. Notwithstanding these 
recent advances, contemporary paradigms of urban development do not substantively 
account for the ways in which the social, political, economic and physical aspects of urban 
form interact and shape the mechanics of security provision in cities. 
There is a perceptible gap in development policy, compromising the manner in which 
international donors, multilateral agencies, national and sub-national policymakers respond 
to urban challenges today. Part of this gap is due to the separation between development 
theory or urban planning, and issues of fragility due to conflict and violence. These have 
usually been different epistemic and operational domains, to the detriment of either a 
comprehensive approach to analysing fragility and violence or effective approaches to 
security provision. 
Key findings 
By applying the predominant development practices and paradigms in use today to the 
potential challenges identified in future cities, we find that: 
1. There are multiple and overlapping forms of violence, and the ways these interact 
have important consequences for understanding violence and order in future cities. 
2. Violence is likely to be both a positive and negative stimulus for governance 
institutions at the city and national level. 
3. The imposition of order in cities affects people differently and requires asking ‘security 
for whom’ in order to achieve universally inclusive outcomes. 
4. Some of the most fragile and conflict-affected countries today are projected to be 
mostly urban in the near future. Segmentation in the treatment of issues of security 
and order in cities will debilitate comprehensive interventions as well as macro 
understandings of the processes of state-building in fragile contexts. 
5. More than half of the world’s urban population will reside in relatively small towns and 
cities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants. Some of these towns will rapidly grow into 
large cities. However, the current evidence base from these locations continues to be 
relatively thin concerning the lived experiences of violence and order on the one 
hand, and the mechanics of security provision on the other. 
6. Blind spots related to safety in cities include the issue of non-state providers of 
security, lived experiences of security, and learning from counterfactuals. 
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Dimensions of cities relevant for futures thinking on cities, 
violence and order 
 
Approaches to development that are city-focused should be foregrounded by three 
dimensions of cities, namely, ‘Grid’ – focusing on city spaces, their layout and planning, as 
shaped by economic, political, technological, social and gendered factors; ‘Governance’ – 
focusing on the processes and structures that form the institutions through which people are 
excluded and included; and ‘Ephemerality’ – focusing on the shifting dynamics and identities 
of violence, that are often related to the grid and governance of the city, but not reducible to 
them. 
Policy implications of adopting a city-focused approach to 
development 
We identify three overarching implications for the ways in which donors and other 
stakeholders engage on issues of violence, everyday security and order in cities. 
1. Cities are central to the processes of state consolidation, transformation and erosion. 
Some of the most fragile and conflict-affected countries are projected to have a 
majority of their populations residing in urban areas. This makes it vital to include 
spatially relevant and city-specific thinking in the wider paradigms of peace-building 
and political settlements. 
2. The importance of maintaining focus on different typologies of violence remains 
central, particularly in the face of the varied nature of the lived experiences of 
violence and ‘everyday insecurity’ for city dwellers. Violence might occur ‘on cities’ 
(that is, cities coming under siege). But it might also occur ‘in cities’ (where violence is 
located in urban settings, but almost by circumstance), or it may be ‘inherent to cities’ 
(where the type and modalities of violence are specifically urban in nature; and even 
become ingrained in the everyday fabric of urban life). The three levels are deeply 
interconnected (through the cross-cutting theme of gender, for instance), but they 
also present significantly different challenges in terms of entry points for violence 
mitigation strategies. 
3. Planning, policy or design interventions that misinterpret ‘ordered cities’ as 
synonymous with ‘planned’, ‘smart’ or even ‘charter’ cities, are likely to create 
insecurity, not reduce it. Urban order can also be repressive and exclusionary, and 
these processes can occur over very long periods of time. As such, ‘order and 
security for whom?’ continues to be the operative question that significantly impacts 
outcomes. 
Grid
GovernanceEphemerality
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Implications for research on cities 
The predominant view in the literature on urban violence is that the state is one of several 
actors involved in the processes and actions that produce or mitigate everyday violence, 
alongside local, non-state and other sovereign groups. The focus has therefore shifted away 
from a singular understanding of the role of the state, and moved towards processes of 
governance and multiple sovereignties that come together to produce outcomes of violence 
and order. 
In this context, we identify two significant research gaps that presently limit policymaking: 
1. Evidence from small but growing towns: more than half of the world’s urban 
population currently live in small towns of fewer than 500,000 people. Some of these 
towns will grow into large cities in the near future. While some of these growing 
agglomerations, such as Juba (South Sudan) or Buenaventura (Colombia), already 
feature in the research agendas on violence and order, others such as Lubango 
(Angola), Herat (Afghanistan), Pokhara (Nepal) or Muzaffarpur (India), continue to be 
hidden from view. A richer evidence base from these locations is required to enable 
comprehensive planning with timely interventions. 
2. Deep knowledge of municipal functioning: as everyday violence and fragility goes 
beyond simple statistics of violent crime, future studies should explicitly include the 
differently governed or non-state governed spaces that the statistics identify. This 
also includes the destabilising factors that urban pressure can bring on the one hand 
to national politics, and the positive element that this might have on forcing greater 
accountability on political elites. On the other, we might have ‘pirate’ cities in regards 
to how citizens have created their own service systems, which reflect the ways in 
which governance failures have an impact on local communities. A critical area where 
further research in this regard is still needed is on the day-to-day functioning of 
municipal governance, opening up the ‘black box’ of how local officials and front-line 
staff function and make decisions in practice. As municipalities will continue to be on 
the frontlines of how urban security provision is conceptualised and delivered, the 
importance of understanding how municipal authorities operate can hardly be 
stressed more strongly. 
The futures thinking presented in this study is relevant for mega-cities such as Mumbai and 
Rio de Janeiro, as they continue to change, but importantly also for smaller towns and cities 
that are projected to host more than 500,000 residents particularly in fragile and conflict-
affected countries. In either setting, experience shows that a ‘get the economy right first’ 
approach, or even focusing too much on national institutions of government, without paying 
attention to local government, might create social and political fissures leading to violence in 
cities. Institutional conditions and governance arrangements are such that they tend to 
exacerbate processes of marginalisation, unless that is, issues of inclusion are explicitly 
placed on the table. 
Foresighting cityscapes in 2040 – a note on methods 
A group of urban experts and leading thinkers representing a broad range of disciplinary 
perspectives identified more than 50 potential drivers of change that might characterise 
cities in 2040. These were then distilled into eight slider-scales including the nature of 
technological change; the impact of technology on social interactions; health of the global 
economy; the nature of political power; population dynamics; access to services; how the city 
fits within broader narratives of development; and the type of impacts resulting from climate 
change. Care was taken not to reduce any one scale to a simplistic value judgement – i.e. 
‘good’ versus ‘bad’ or ‘positive’ versus ‘negative’. Instead, the ends of each scale signify a 
nuanced calibration (to maximum or zero effect) of the identified drivers of change. 
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Linear/incremental change 
Technological change
 
Rapid/disruptive change 
Increasingly virtual interaction 
Technology and social interactions
 
Interactions through 
physical contact 
Recession 
Global economy 
 
Growth 
Dispersed 
Political power 
 
Centralised 
Differentiated 
Demographic change
 
Rapid population growth 
Inclusive 
Access to services 
 
Exclusionary 
Thriving 
Meanings of the city 
 
Static/maturing/ 
possibly in decline 
Low/mild impacts 
Climate change 
 
Extreme/frequent impacts 
Varying combinations of these slider-scales are used to determine the boundaries within 
which future ‘cityscapes’ are generated. Cityscapes are characterisations of what cities might 
look like in the future. Foresight techniques are not meant to predict the future. Rather, they 
produce potential cityscapes that can be used as heuristic tools to help consider the nature 
of challenges in the future, and the types of policy response, both today and in the future, 
that these might necessitate. 
Potential policy responses to everyday violence, armed conflict and climate change are 
placed within these potential cityscapes to provide a meaningful assessment of how they 
might operate and the impacts they might have. This material is then supplemented with 
expert consultations across a wide range of donors, practitioners and academic experts to 
identify key biases and blind spots in research, policy and practice. 
JG, 7 January 2016 
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1 Introduction 
Cities are not only critical nodes of governance in the global North and South, but also play a 
‘critical role in the processes of state consolidation, transformation and erosion’ (Beall, 
Goodfellow and Rodgers 2013: 1). Indeed, as Tilly (2010) argued, the changing relationships 
between cities and states can help us understand the centrality of cities in such processes. 
At the same time, the state is no longer regarded as the sole or uncontested provider of 
security in cities. This is due to two key advances in knowledge around, firstly, how cities as 
a unit of government grew to be distinct from the nation state that is weakened in an ever-
globalised world (see for example Schiller and Fouron 2003). As Friedman argues: 
the focality of the state in identity formation is giving way to competing identities from 
indigenous, regional, and migratory populations. The latter has also entailed a 
decentralisation of resources within the state… and an increasing division of powers, 
between the state as the representative of the nation and the subgroups that tend to 
displace it. 
(Friedman 2003: 8) 
Secondly, the state is viewed as one of several actors centrally involved in the processes 
and actions that produce and mitigate violence (see for example Punch 2012), alongside 
local, non-state and other sovereign groups (Muggah 2014, 2015b). In parsing out the nature 
of state violence, the focus has therefore shifted away from a singular understanding of the 
role of the nation state, and moved towards processes of governance (Nugent 2004) and 
multiple sovereignties (Rodgers 2006b) that come together to produce outcomes of security 
and insecurity. In turn, the diverse types of violent encounters so produced only bear a 
superficial connection with the structures of the nation state, but instead, play out in the 
everyday (even intimate) spaces in the city (Datta 2012). 
The most complex of these relationships are invariably playing out in the cities of low- and 
middle-income countries (Muggah 2015a), where most of the urban population growth in the 
coming three decades is set to take place (United Nations 2014). It is in these contexts that 
everyday lived experiences of violence undermine the confidence of citizens in government 
systems, directly and indirectly have a negative impact on livelihoods, and frequently reduce 
the quality and quantity of service provision. Though these impacts are varied and often 
characterised as hyper-local, they do collectively shape wider discussions on governance 
and state fragility at the national scale (Commins 2010). 
1.1 Moving beyond the ‘feral’ versus ‘charter’ city 
characterisations 
When it comes to the subtleties of addressing the concerns of how security will be provided 
in cities in the future, however, there has been a lack of thinking beyond simplistic doomsday 
scenarios or utopian projections. This is reflected in what are arguably simplistic 
understandings of order, governance and control in cities of the developing world. 
At one end of this continuum are ‘feral cities’ (Norton 2010), characterised by a complete 
failure of the state to maintain the rule of law, thereby being overrun by all-subsuming slums 
(Davis 2006). As a result of their collective failures, state apparatuses at both the city and 
national levels are viewed in a non-distinguishable manner. They are contrasted only with a 
paradoxical balance between on the one hand informal institutions that control the city, and 
on the other, the greater international systems, such as trade and communications, that 
continue unabated to connect with the city (Bunker and Sullivan 2011). At the other end of 
this spectrum are ‘charter cities’ (Romer 2014). Romer describes these as monolithic entities, 
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newly created to be free of the vested interests and inefficient rules and bureaucracies that 
hinder security, growth and development. 
Aside from the two extreme characterisations, pertinent questions around how security in 
cities will be understood in the future, how and for whom it will be provided, and how it will be 
governed, remain largely unanswered. A growing body of evidence showcases the 
heterogeneity of security processes and outcomes, both within and between cities (Gupte, 
Justino and Tranchant 2014). Notwithstanding these recent advances, contemporary 
paradigms of urban development do not substantively account for the ways in which the 
social, political, economic and physical aspects of urban form interact and shape the 
mechanics of security provision in cities. Part of this gap is due to the separation between 
development theory or urban planning on the one hand, and issues of security, conflict and 
violence on the other. These have usually been different intellectual and programmatic 
domains, to the detriment of a coherent approach to either analysis of insecurity or effective 
approaches to security provision. The gap also arises due to the weak knowledge base from 
which public policy is formulated. Most of the evidence is almost exclusively focused on the 
United States and to a lesser extent on the United Kingdom and Europe. For Latin America, 
for instance, Cohen and Rubio (2009) find that the few programmes from other regions that 
have been evaluated or reported on as being promising have not had the benefit of 
independent reviews and thus should not be considered as reliable evidence. They note that 
it is not easy to find even a rough inventory of what is being done. 
This has left a perceptible gap in development policy, compromising the manner in which we 
respond to urban challenges today. 
1.2 Research questions and design of the study 
This study is driven by three main research questions: 
1. What might the challenges of security provision in cities look like in the future? 
2. How can development policy and practice pre-emptively respond today? 
3. What types of programmes should be given greater priority and support in the future? 
The methodology used to answer these questions is centred around a ‘futures workshop’, 
which we explain in more detail in Section 2. A review of the relevant literature as well as 
relevant programmes, policies and interventions in a selection of cities, preceded the futures 
workshop. Both reviews were conducted iteratively and fed off one another. Following the 
futures workshop, a series of consultations with key informants (KI), stakeholders and 
experts were conducted, in order to help ground the workshop findings in current stakeholder 
and donor priorities. Data from the consultations also fed back into the review. The study 
design is illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
1.3 Purpose and structure of report 
This report summarises the methods and main findings of this Foresight study. The 
techniques used enable systematic thinking around what might be the current blind spots in 
policy, research and programming, and how we can pre-emptively respond to these 
challenges today. The report is structured as follows: a description of the Foresight 
methodologies used, and the dimensions of urban form relevant for futures thinking on cities, 
violence and order, are provided in Section 2. In Section 3 we present the key concepts (of 
violence and order) and trends describing the changing geography of violence, and how 
these have come to be centred on cities. Based on the conceptual framework developed for 
this study, case study material from two cities (Mumbai and Rio de Janeiro) is presented in 
Section 4. Section 5 expands on the Foresight methodology in more detail, focusing on the 
drivers of change in future cities. In this section we also describe three future cityscapes that 
might potentially describe cities in 2040. Each of these cityscapes is used as a heuristic tool 
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to think through what the potential impacts of everyday insecurities, violence and armed 
conflict and climate change might be, and what policy response might look like in these 
future scenarios. The final section charts potential blind spots in current research and 
programming initiatives. 
Figure 1.1 Design of cities, violence and order study 
 
  
Literature review 
Review of programmes, 
policies, interventions 
Futures workshop: 
STEEP analysis 
Drivers of change 
Cityscapes 2040 
KI/stakeholder/expert consultations 
KI/stakeholder/expert consultations 
KI/stakeholder/expert consultations 
Cityscapes now (case studies) 
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2 Foresight methodologies 
2.1 What is Foresight? 
Foresight techniques are not aimed at predicting the future – but they help in identifying a 
range of possibilities that help define, heuristically, what might shape the future, and in what 
ways. The methods invite us to consider the future as something that we can create or 
shape, rather than as something already decided. Foresight exercises (FE) are based on the 
premise that imaginative yet systematic assessments can assist urban planners, decision-
makers and communities in exploring possibilities and scenarios for the future. As Béné et al. 
(2014) find, FE are increasingly used by urban literature scholars, planners and decision-
makers in cities around the world to develop strategies, visions and plans. One of the most 
quoted definitions of FE stems from Martin (1995, in Hartmann 2011), who describes 
research Foresight as: 
the process involved in systematically attempting to look into the longer-term future of 
science, technology, the economy and society with the aim of identifying the areas of 
strategic research and the emerging generic technologies likely to yield the greatest 
economic and social benefits. 
(Martin 1995, in Hartmann 2011: 335) 
In this study, we define Foresight as ‘the systematic outlook to detect early signs of 
potentially important developments. These can be weak (or early) signals, trends, wild cards 
or other developments, persistent problems, risks and threats, including matters at the 
margins of current thinking that challenge past assumptions’ (Cuhls 2015: 3). 
Extensive and rapid transformation of both local and global environments, posing new 
challenges for urban planners and governments, has triggered an increased reliance on FE 
(Béné et al. 2014), as has the recognition that current planning methods are less effective in 
dealing with these challenges (Krawczyk and Ratcliffe 2005). Hartmann (2011) points out 
that FE are increasingly used as tools to systematically develop or adjust strategic plans in 
order to: 
● support decision-making and provide quantitative and qualitative input to strategic 
decisions for investments or actions; 
● stir new ideas, identify opportunities and provide information on possible new 
markets, policy measures or other activities; 
● increase anticipatory intelligence and provide information on future developments. 
This can help identify possible actions that can be reflected against, to increase the 
insight of their future context. 
The Cities, Violence and Order team brought together a group of urban experts from a broad 
set of disciplinary backgrounds to participate in a ‘Foresight’ workshop to envision the 
possible futures of violence and order in our cities. Foresight techniques have traditionally 
been used in policy testing and strategy development by a range of business, governmental 
and, more recently, non-governmental actors (see Bingley 2014). The workshop process 
drew on a number of Foresight techniques, adapting them and modifying them to meet a 
range of objectives and to ensure that all participants had the opportunity to share their 
specific knowledge and expertise. The expert group included: 
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Ali Madanipour, Newcastle University 
Alison Brown, Cardiff University 
Alun Rhydderch, Horizon Scanning Ltd. 
Dennis Rodgers, University of Glasgow 
Edward Bell, Department for International 
Development (DFID) 
Eric Kasper, Institute of Development Studies  
(IDS) 
Fran Seballos, IDS 
Gareth Jones, London School of Economics and  
Political Science (LSE) 
Gareth Wall, Commonwealth Local Government  
Forum (CLGF) 
Gordon McGranahan, International Institute for  
Environment and Development (IIED) and IDS 
Hadeer El Shafi, IDS 
Jaideep Gupte, IDS 
John Gaventa, IDS 
Kevin Savage, World Vision International 
Robert Muggah, Igarapé Institute, Brazil  
[by video-link] 
Roger Williamson, IDS 
Sheela Patel, Society for the Promotion of Area  
Resource Centers (SPARC), India [by video-link] 
Steve Commins, University of California, Los  
Angeles (UCLA) 
Susan Parnell, African Centre for Cities (ACC),  
University of Cape Town 
Thea Shahrokh, IDS 
Wendy Pullan, University of Cambridge 
The process of creating the future cityscapes for this study involved identifying the potential 
drivers of change, formulating a selection of these drivers as slider-scales, and then allowing 
experts to select up to four slider-scales to help define the parameters of the cityscapes. 
These steps are defined in more detail below: 
Figure 2.1 Creating cityscapes 2040 
 
2.2 Dimensions of urban form relevant for futures thinking on 
cities, violence and order 
The workshop adapted a scenario planning process with the twin aims of ‘characterising 
what the challenges of security provision in cities might look like in 2040’ and ‘formulating 
ideas on how development policy and practice can pre-emptively respond today’. The 
process was designed to generate a set of narrative scenarios of the city in the future, 
referred to throughout the process as ‘cityscapes’. Shocks and stresses could be overlaid 
these cityscapes to ‘test’ their resilience. The resilience testing process would reveal 
weaknesses in the social, political and economic structure of the cityscape. Near-term 
development policy and practice interventions could then be designed to address these 
weaknesses and mitigate future impact. 
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For the purposes of this Foresight study, we conceptualised ‘violence’ and ‘order’ in cities as 
being functions of three interconnected dimensions (D) of the urban form: 
D1. Grid – focusing on city spaces, their layout and planning, as shaped by economic, 
political, technological, social and gendered factors. 
D2. Governance – focusing on the processes and structures that form the institutions 
through which people are excluded and included; sociopolitical voice and participation 
versus marginality and exclusion; willingness and capacity of state actors. 
D3. Ephemerality – focusing on the shifting dynamics and identities of violence that are 
often related to the grid and governance of the city, but not reducible to them. 
Figure 2.2 Three dimensions of urban form – violence and order (V & O) in 
cities are a function of D1 (Grid), D2 (Governance) and D3 (Ephemerality) 
 
These dimensions were conceptualised such that cities may display different configurations, 
with one or two of the dimensions dominating depending on local, temporal or spatial 
contexts. In the illustration above, the three dimensions of urban form are shown to have 
elements that are unique to each dimension, as well as elements that fall within the overlap 
of two, or all three, dimensions. 
It is important, however, to acknowledge upfront that this three-way articulation was 
not envisioned to be an exhaustive description of the urban form, and was used more 
as a heuristic tool to widen the group’s thinking, rather than as a framework to limit 
the scope of discussions. Indeed, several alternate castings are plausible, including one 
that is interpreted through the dimensions of Infrastructure-Governance-Contingency, or 
around Planning-Policing-Possibilities, for example, or castings that use fewer or more 
dimensions. The point of such a heuristic tool is not only to systematise thinking about cities 
into the various dimensions, but importantly to push us to focus on the overlaps of two, or 
more, dimensions. 
Grid
GovernanceEphemerality
V & O 
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For example, the organisational set-up of municipalities would pertain to the governance 
dimension (D2), while the role of non-state actors in the provision of essential services such 
as water or neighbourhood policing would be placed in the overlap of the governance and 
ephemerality dimensions (D2  D3). As another example, elements of the city master plan, 
such as zoning demarcations (hawker zones, for instance) would be placed in the grid 
dimension (D1), but multiple or shifting uses of public spaces (street markets during the day, 
places of congregation or prayer in the evening, for instance) would be placed at the 
intersection of the grid and ephemerality dimensions (D1  D3). 
Based on this typology, ‘violence’ and ‘order’ in the city are placed at the intersection of all 
three dimensions (D1  D2  D3). Doing so recognises that both ‘violent’ and ‘ordered’ 
outcomes in cities result from varying combinations of elements in each of the three 
dimensions. We will therefore use this typology to identify the elements pertaining to each 
dimension for the issues we focus on. For example, ‘everyday violence’ in cities could be 
broken into the following elements: 
Figure 2.3 Theorising the interactions between urban forms and everyday 
violence 
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3 Key concepts and trends 
3.1 Violence 
One of the most complete definitions of urban violence continues to be Moser’s (2004) 
introductory roadmap that introduces a wide spectrum of ‘lethal violence and its associated 
fear and insecurity’ occurring in cities. Scholarship on violence has alerted us to look beyond 
the physicality of urban violence, and recognise the gendered, spatial and psychological 
manifestations of violence (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004). Cities often contain unsafe 
spaces, in which women, men and children experience violence in very different ways, and 
these experiences vary depending on the time of day. They can be reflective of poor 
infrastructure or design of public spaces, public transport networks, or isolated areas such as 
dark paths and lanes, isolated bus stops or public latrines. These experiences are often 
exacerbated for the poorest in cities who, for example, need to commute long distances to 
work at odd hours, or who live in precarious locations that compromise the safety of 
residents. 
The roadmap also highlighted the various policy approaches adopted to intervene in 
situations of urban violence. These are summarised in Table 3.1. 
Advances in the scholarship on urban violence has extended our view beyond singular 
modalities of violence, to overlapped categories (for example, violence that is simultaneously 
political, social and economic, as described in Beall et al. 2013), or recognising the cityscape 
as inherently conflictual and only ‘tipping’ into violence when social, cultural and political 
mechanisms are not able to maintain peace (Moser and Rodgers 2012). Others characterise 
the ‘fragile city’ itself as an emergent social category (Muggah 2014). We are also challenged 
to view low-intensity violence not just as destructive, but also as a generator of social and 
entrepreneurial innovation (Rodgers 2006a; also see Box 3.1) (Clay and Phillips 2015). The 
ways in which different manifestations of urban fragility may interact with regional and 
national political settlements has been gaining attention as part of a spatial approach to 
fragility (Commins 2014). Where low-intensity violence is endemic, it interacts with the urban 
fabric and changes the nature of adequate urban living (Gupte 2012). In instances of 
extreme violence, the everyday spaces, sites and infrastructures of cities – along with their 
civilian populations – become the main source of targets and threats (Graham 2009). 
3.2 Order 
Similarly, the literature on ‘order’ in cities has a long history of scholarship, which now 
distinguishes it from ‘city design’. While the latter refers to the design or planning of a city in a 
definite form at a given point in time, the former refers to the consistency of urban 
components and their relationships (Marshall 2009). This difference is particularly important 
since order need not be equated with ‘planning’. Urban order can contribute to city design, 
but urban order may exist without a finite design being involved. Le Corbusier designs, for 
instance, envisaged ‘cities of tomorrow’ as vast, planned and rational spaces (LeGates and 
Stout 2011). In doing so, he imagined a ‘good city’ as having definite order (a seminal 
critique of this approach can be found in Scott 1998). ‘It was assumed that the unruliness of 
the city could, and should, be planned away through rational, planned interventions into the 
organisation of urban space’ (Mooney, Pile and Brook 1999: 3). 
Though Le Corbusier’s ‘utopian’ vision1 continues to be extremely influential on the design of 
cityscapes today, ethnographic explorations of the city have shown us that even in the so-
called ‘unplanned’ spaces, prevailing sociopolitical and spatial relationships at the local level 
                                               
1 Other ‘utopianists’ include Ebenezer Howard and Frank Lloyd Wright; see Fishman (1982). 
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imply that order exists. Remarkably, this is also true during moments of extreme urban 
violence or contexts of protracted violence (such as in informal settlements, as described in 
Gupte 2012). Thus a duality in our understanding of ‘order’ in cities emerges where, at one 
level, ordered cities can be exclusionary, repressive and ironically unruly, because of the 
unevenness of power relations their order generates (Mooney et al. 1999). As Gayer (2014) 
argues in his tour de force on Karachi, through the prevailing practices of planners and 
builders, the city can add fuel to violent social movements. 
Table 3.1 A roadmap of violence in cities and the policy interventions 
employed 
Policy approach Objective Type of violence Innovative urban-focused 
intervention 
Criminal justice Violence deterrence and 
control through higher 
arrest and conviction 
rates, and more severe 
punishment 
Crime Judicial reform 
Robbery 
Corruption 
Crime Police reform 
Robbery 
Delinquency Accessible justice systems; 
mobile courts Robbery 
Family violence 
Family violence Community policing; all-women 
police stations 
Public health Violence prevention 
through the reduction of 
individual risk factors 
Youth violence Youth policies/social protection; 
education reform; 
entrepreneurship 
Youth violence Vocational skills training; cultural 
and recreational activities 
Promotion of behavioural change 
Conflict 
transformation/
human rights 
Non-violent resolution of 
conflict through 
negotiation and legal 
enforcement of human 
rights by states and other 
social actors 
Political violence Traditional systems of justice 
Institutional violence Government human rights 
advocates or ombudsman; civil 
society advocacy; NGOs 
Human rights abuses 
Arbitrary detention 
‘Crime prevention 
through 
environmental 
design’/urban 
renewal 
Reduction in violence 
opportunities through 
focusing on the settings of 
crime rather than on the 
perpetrators 
Economic violence  Municipal-level programmes 
Social violence 
Citizen/public/
community 
security 
Set of cross-sector 
measures to prevent or 
reduce violence 
Economic violence National-level programmes; 
municipal-level programmes 
Social violence 
Social capital ‘Rebuilding’ social capital, 
trust and cohesion in 
informal and formal social 
institutions 
Youth gangs Community-based solutions 
Domestic/family 
violence 
Crisis services for victims; 
ongoing support and prevention; 
communication campaigns; 
school programmes; 
programmes for perpetrators 
Source: Moser (2004: 12). 
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Box 3.1 Certain forms of violence can be socially constitutive rather 
than deconstructive 
It is difficult to question the notion that the urban future will be violent. At the same time, however, 
questions nevertheless need to be asked about this violence, to problematise our understanding of 
the phenomena as it relates to urban contexts. Order can be violent, just as violence can be order. 
Order is not a neutral concept, it is an eminently political and therefore normative notion; the 
segregated city can be orderly, yet fundamentally violent in denying opportunities and possibilities 
to vast swathes of an urban population, for example. My own work on gang dynamics in Nicaragua, 
for example, has highlighted how under certain conditions certain forms of violence can be socially 
constitutive rather than deconstructive. In general, then, we need to move away from naturalising 
order and violence, and to think about their social functions more critically. 
Violence can be a generator of innovation and dynamism (just as a little inflation is good for an 
economy). It provokes action and reaction. Indeed, you could push this contention further and argue 
that there might actually be a trade-off between securitisation and innovation in cities, and the 
current trend to trying to promote ‘safer and more secure cities’ is likely to be stifling…Obviously, 
questions can be raised regarding the potential associated with different kinds of violence. A 
distinction can certainly be made between internal and external forms of urban violence, for 
example. External forms of violence are unlikely to be a source of dynamism and innovation. 
Internal forms of violence, on the other hand, can have much more positive effects, with the high 
levels of chronic crime and delinquency that respectively plagued New York in the 1970s and 
Medellin in the 1990s arguably the cause for the well-known urban ‘renaissances’ that both cities 
subsequently underwent in the 1980s and 2000s, for example. Seen from this perspective, rather 
than focusing on violence, it may well be more interesting and promising to consider what structures 
and institutions allow a city beset by violence to best channel the phenomenon’s promise. 
One way of conceiving of this is in terms of ‘resilience’. But we need to be clear about the kind of 
resilience we are talking about here. The notion is currently much in vogue, and seems to principally 
involve the identification of ‘best practice’ local projects. The historical experience of urban violence 
in cities such as New York and Medellin manifestly suggest that resilience can only ever really be 
systemic, however. 
(extracted from Rodgers 2015) 
 
At another level, contestation, conflict and even violent revolution are viewed as fundamental 
components of order in cities. We have seen this in medieval Europe, where the parameters 
of order and disorder switch such that ‘revolts were not… an antithesis, subversion or 
pathology of the political order, but formed a fundamental part of the political interactions in 
late medieval cities’ (Lantschner 2014: 4). We also see this in modern-day African cities 
where the destruction of protracted war has scarred the cityscape. Though parts of Monrovia 
or Freetown might be seen as urban ‘warscapes’, 
…on the basis of the configuration of space, bodies, subjects, and violence within 
specific locations… these cities are best understood not in terms of destruction but as 
zones of excessive production. Like any space of capitalist production, the crucial 
element is the organization of labor. 
(Hoffman 2007: 402) 
Inspired by Agamben’s writing on the camp, Hoffman suggests that the organising principle 
of modernity of West Africa’s postmodernity is the barracks. He argues that ‘the barracks 
concentrate bodies (particularly male bodies) and subjects into formations that can be 
deployed quickly and efficiently… They may be called up at any moment as laborers on the 
battlefield, workers on the plantation, or diggers in the mine’ (Hoffman 2007: 402). That is, 
rather than viewing war as destroying the order in (or of) cities, it creates a new, even 
productive, order. This may be characterised as ‘infrastructural violence’ wherein the 
interactions between urban order and violence have implications for ‘spatially just cities’ 
(Rodgers and O’Neill 2012). 
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Yet another layer of framing order in cities locates the violence within ‘conflict infrastructures’ 
(Pullan 2013). In this framing, material structures within contested cities – walls, fences and 
mobility regimes – are viewed as necessary measures to separate and protect vulnerable 
populations in the midst of violent urban conflict (Pullan, Baillie and Kyriacou 2013) – as in 
Nicosia, Belfast and Jerusalem (Gaffikin and Morrisey 2011). In keeping with our broader 
understanding of order, these instruments of ‘territoriality’ (as used in Moore 2015) can 
protect just as they can be divisive or oppressive. They can create places of exchange, just 
as they ‘incorporate the breakdown of laws and institutions’ (Pullan 2011: 16) to suit the 
actors and agents of violence. They also can be used to separate by class or ethnicity, as in 
the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil or, increasingly, in the processes of urbanisation in Lima, 
Peru. 
3.3 Cities, violence and order: the ‘everyday’ realities of urban 
living 
In this study we continue to use both concepts – violence and order – as a heuristic way to 
broaden the study’s vision. We do not use them in an interchangeable sense, nor do we 
characterise the two concepts as opposites. It is evident that the conceptual framings of 
‘violence’ and ‘order’, as described in the sections above, share a great deal of commonality; 
not just in their pedagogical development, but also through the experiential evidence that has 
supported their advancement. Nevertheless, ‘violence’ and ‘order’ are also distinct in several 
ways that enable interactional relationships among the city, the economy, society as well as 
structures of power (Short 1996). 
By employing both concepts, we are able to recognise that, at a level of aggregation that 
affords a holistic view of cities, ‘security’ and ‘insecurity’ are part of the same continuum. That 
is, situations that may be characterised as being ‘secure’, may only be characterised as such 
by people of certain genders or groups; in certain locations within the city; or in certain 
sociotemporal contexts. Those very situations could also be seen as being ‘insecure’ for 
different people or groups, in different locations, or in different sociotemporal contexts. In 
this, poor and marginalised groups are not only disproportionately impacted by urban 
violence, but evidence from cities across the developed and developing world show that they 
also display a variety of responses to living with violence and insecurity, and often can 
contribute independently and directly to building safer communities. By doing so, we implicitly 
include both – cities that are thriving as well as cities, or spaces within them, that are in 
decay. 
As such, it is possible to conceive the fragility continuum in urban areas as relating to five 
interconnected and overlapping dimensions as outlined in an OECD report on fragile states. 
Recent work by the OECD has shifted away from ranking fragile states, and towards an 
approach that considers five dimensions of fragility (OECD 2015): 
 
● violence (and crime) 
● justice 
● institutions 
● economic foundations 
● resilience. 
Thus, for people in urban areas, part of their reality is what could be described as the 
conjunction of some of these factors that underpin ‘everyday fragility’. They experience highly 
unequal access to services, they live in ‘differently governed’ not ‘ungoverned’ spaces, and 
there frequently is a strong sense of abandonment (or predation) by the state and state 
actors.2 Frequently the central authorities within urban government have the view that the 
                                               
2 One researcher, Garth Myers, reported: ‘One of our interviewees in Pikine outside Dakar said it best: “the government doesn’t 
give a damn about us here”’ (Garth Myers, written communication). 
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marginalised communities are ‘not my problem’. Thus, for example, urban sprawl crosses 
governmental boundaries, and falls into the cracks as urban borderlands. The term ‘everyday 
fragility’ also reflects the greater risk to disasters, many of them ‘small’, such as fires, 
mudslides, local flooding or waste exposure. 
From this point of view, then, violence prevention or security provision, may also be seen as 
‘in the vernacular… [that is]… through the eyes of “end-users” of security arrangements, and 
how it is determined in the power laden and multi-levelled contexts of contemporary violent 
conflicts’ (Luckham and Kirk 2013: 339). This is an ‘end-user’ approach to security, wherein 
security is a basic entitlement of those who are supposed to be protected, and contrasts with 
understandings of security as the creation and maintenance of authoritative social orders 
including, but not confined to, those we term states. 
3.4 Key trends 
There is good reason for cities to be described as the ‘new frontier’ for international 
development (DFID 2010). Nearly two thirds of the global population of 9.1 billion in 2050 is 
projected to be urban. This implies a doubling of the global urban population from 3.3 billion 
currently, to 6 billion in 2050 (United Nations 2014). Tokyo is the world’s largest city with an 
agglomeration of 38 million inhabitants, followed by Delhi with 25 million, Shanghai with 23 
million, and Mexico City, Mumbai and São Paulo, each with around 21 million inhabitants. By 
2030, the world is projected to have 41 mega-cities with more than 10 million inhabitants. 
While approximately half the world’s urban population lives in smaller towns, our focus in this 
study is maintained on the larger urban agglomerations, as well as the smaller towns that are 
projected to grow to host more than 500,000 residents (see Table 3.2). These growing towns 
and cities are key as markers for policy and programming interventions on violence 
mitigation. 
We find that while some of these growing agglomerations, such as Juba (South Sudan) or 
Buenaventura (Colombia), are already beginning to feature in the research agendas on 
violence and order, others such as Lubango (Angola), Herat (Afghanistan), Pokhara (Nepal) 
or Muzaffarpur (India), however, continue to be relatively hidden from international view. 
Nevertheless, these are all locations where there are growing concerns over violence and 
order, ranging from the increasing presence of gang and criminal activity in Pokhara, violent 
evictions in Lubango, to social unrest and mob violence in Muzaffarpur. 
Violence in both urban and rural contexts is a serious threat to human security (UN-Habitat 
2007), and disproportionately impacts those who are already poor and marginalised (Justino 
2007). Recent research points to the increasingly urban geography of violence (Buhaug and 
Urdal 2013; Raleigh 2015). This moves us beyond thinking of urban violence only as a 
periodic segment of war that is otherwise a rural phenomenon. When the violence of war 
does spill into urban areas, it is invariably indicative of changing strength ratios between 
rebels and government (see for example Holtermann 2014). We also know that violence 
against civilians during civil wars now occurs predominantly in urban areas (Raleigh 2012). 
 
Box 3.2 The varied modalities of urban violence in Africa 
The most violent African cities in recent years aptly demonstrate the variation in conflict forms and 
patterns. Militia activity in Benghazi, Libya; riots and protests in Cairo, Egypt; rebel and militia 
violence in Kismayo, Somalia; and rebels and militias in Bangui, Central African Republic reflect the 
variety of political contexts and consequences that give rise to urban violence. Countries affected by 
political instability – but without civil wars – often experience the highest levels of urban unrest, and 
rates are highest during periods of political contest, including elections and other periods of national 
instability. 
(extracted from Raleigh 2015: 91) 
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Table 3.2 Small towns and cities with at least 300,000 people today that 
will soon host more than 500,000 people – these are key as markers for 
where policy and programming interventions on violence mitigation are 
likely to be located 
Rank (by % 
change) 
Urban agglomeration Pop. in 2015 Pop. in 2030 % change 
1 Lubango, Angola 370,679 751,231 102.66 
2 Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 485,013 940,399 93.89 
3 Hosur, India 352,261 678,939 92.74 
4 Goma, DRC 474,007 885,428 86.80 
5 Uvira, DRC 442,399 824,193 86.30 
6 Juba, South Sudan 321,115 596,192 85.66 
7 Roorkee, India 396,581 724,367 82.65 
8 Begusarai, India 361,544 656,714 81.64 
9 Santipur, India 395,703 686,223 73.42 
10 Ranipet, India 357,852 618,581 72.86 
11 Kikwit, DRC 427,245 724,708 69.62 
12 Mbandaka, DRC 375,621 633,873 68.75 
13 Herat, Afghanistan 337,381 564,793 67.41 
14 Kandahar, Afghanistan 428,849 717,068 67.21 
15 Pokhara, Nepal 329,424 549,238 66.73 
16 Matadi, DRC 336,740 559,850 66.26 
17 Likasi, DRC 494,449 815,430 64.92 
18 Comilla, Bangladesh 493,473 792,663 60.63 
19 Barisal, Bangladesh 408,041 652,917 60.01 
20 Purnia, India 377,810 586,936 55.35 
21 Dindigul, India 345,873 524,984 51.79 
22 Kolwezi, DRC 480,600 725,045 50.86 
23 Rangpur, Bangladesh 370,280 557,896 50.67 
24 Kottayam, India 420,768 633,707 50.61 
25 English Bazar, India 379,319 568,835 49.96 
26 Hardwar, India 359,395 533,923 48.56 
27 Anantapur, India 395,171 585,773 48.23 
28 Karimnagar, India 344,638 509,334 47.79 
29 Mymensingh, Bangladesh 429,416 632,800 47.36 
30 Shillong, India 399,073 577,555 44.72 
31 Kadapa, India 387,041 559,684 44.61 
32 Bijapur, India 363,456 521,134 43.38 
33 Bellary, India 456,788 654,007 43.18 
34 Alwar, India 379,640 543,349 43.12 
35 Muzaffarpur, India 438,546 627,538 43.10 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from United Nations (2014). 
(Cont’d.) 
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Table 3.2 (cont’d.) 
36 Bhilwara, India 400,455 572,921 43.07 
37 Junagadh, India 354,471 505,533 42.62 
38 Latur, India 424,573 605,464 42.61 
39 Rohtak, India 412,544 586,729 42.22 
40 Rustenburg, South Africa 382,716 544,001 42.14 
41 Yamunanagar, India 421,381 595,995 41.44 
42 Panipat, India 486,087 686,248 41.18 
43 Rampur, India 382,367 539,653 41.13 
44 Brahmapur, India 388,200 545,753 40.59 
45 Barddhaman, India 376,698 527,325 39.99 
46 Sagar, India 399,658 556,127 39.15 
47 Kakinada, India 478,691 665,533 39.03 
48 Davangere, India 469,362 651,571 38.82 
49 Bhagalpur, India 438,792 604,919 37.86 
50 Witbank, South Africa 371,398 511,917 37.84 
51 Korba, India 388,130 532,821 37.28 
52 Dhule, India 391,559 527,207 34.64 
53 Ahmadnagar, India 394,264 529,293 34.25 
54 Akola, India 438,856 582,958 32.84 
55 Buenaventura, Colombia 412,365 543,301 31.75 
56 Valledupar, Colombia 414,567 542,855 30.95 
57 Pôrto Velho, Brazil 463,663 599,996 29.40 
58 Macapá, Brazil 449,433 578,854 28.80 
59 Petrolina, Brazil 425,684 526,629 23.71 
60 Caxias Do Sul, Brazil 467,097 574,196 22.93 
61 Manizales, Colombia 448,951 545,546 21.52 
62 Campos dos Goytacazes, Brazil 447,129 531,712 18.92 
63 Pietermaritzburg, South Africa 494,828 587,714 18.77 
64 Vale do Aço, Brazil 497,065 581,519 16.99 
65 Volta Redonda, Brazil 446,933 517,235 15.73 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from United Nations (2014). 
However, the types of violence associated with war or armed conflict are not the only 
significant modalities of urban violence. The destructive impacts of criminal and everyday 
violence can be more acute than traditional war – the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) finds that ‘by far the largest aspect of the global burden of armed violence is 
the deaths and injuries that occur in non-conflict or non-war settings’ (Geneva Declaration 
Secretariat 2008: 67). Of the 31 most fragile and conflict-affected countries today, 23 are 
projected to be significantly urban in the near future (see Table 3.3). At the same time, 
fatalities due to armed violence in non-war settings far outweigh war-related deaths. Much of 
this violence is centred in cities. Violence, therefore, is increasingly a defining characteristic 
of urban living in both conflict and non-conflict settings. 
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Table 3.3 List of fragile and conflict-affected countries projected to be at 
least 40 per cent urban in 2040, and their current rate of urbanisation 
Country Prop. of population  
urban in 2015 
Prop. of population  
urban in 2040 
Libya 78.6 83.8 
Marshall Islands 72.7 78.2 
Iraq 69.5 75.2 
Congo 65.4 74.3 
Tuvalu 59.7 73.2 
Haiti 58.6 73.1 
Syrian Arab Republic 57.7 67.8 
Côte d’Ivoire 54.2 67.1 
Guinea-Bissau 49.3 61.8 
Liberia 49.7 60.8 
Mali 39.9 55.4 
Togo 40.0 52.9 
Somalia 39.6 52.6 
Sierra Leone 39.9 52.0 
Central African Republic 40.0 51.6 
Kiribati 44.3 51.1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 39.8 49.9 
Madagascar 35.1 49.7 
Myanmar 34.1 48.8 
Yemen 34.6 48.6 
Timor-Leste 32.8 44.8 
Sudan 33.8 44.2 
Afghanistan 26.7 39.5 
Source: Calculated by Author, based on data from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division and the World Bank. 
Table 3.4 Comparing homicide rates (per 100,000) in selected cities with 
the respective national homicide rate 
Most populous city Country City homicide rate National homicide rate Multiple 
Caracas Venezuela 122 (2009) 46 (2009) 2.6 
Guatemala Guatemala 116.6 (2010) 41.4 (2010) 2.8 
Belize Belize 106.4 (2010) 41.7 (2010) 2.5 
Bassetterre St. Kitts and Nevis 97.6 (2009) 38.2 (2010) 2.5 
San Salvador El Salvador 94.6 (2010) 66 (2010) 1.43 
Tegucipalpa Honduras 72.6 (2009) 82.1 (2010) 0.87 
Maseru Lesotho 61.9 (2009) 33.6 (2009) 1.84 
Cape Town South Africa 59.9 (2007) 33.68 (2007) 1.77 
Port of Spain Trinidad and Tobago 60.7 (2008) 35.2 (2009) 1.72 
Panama Panama 34.6 (2010) 21.6 (2010) 1.6 
Source: Based on UNODC data, as presented in Muggah (2012: 29). 
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An often-cited metric for death and victimisation in the city is homicide. According to the most 
recent data available, the 20 cities with the highest non-war related homicide rates were 
predominantly in Latin America and the Caribbean, with a few from sub-Saharan Africa, 
North America and Central Asia also making the list (see Table 3.5). It is also the case that 
homicide rates tend to be higher in cities as Table 3.4 shows. 
Table 3.5 Homicide rate per 100,000 people in 2012 (note where 2012 
data was not available, 2011 data is shown) 
Rank Homicide Rate 
per 100,000 
City Rank Homicide Rate 
per 100,000 
City 
1 105.1 Belize City 11 14.2 Sao Paolo 
2 102.2 Tegucigalpa 12 12 Juba 
3 53.1 Panama City 13 11.9 Ulan Bator 
4 52.5 San Salvador 14 11.4 Quito 
5 50.3 Kingston 15 9 Bishkek 
6 44.2 Nassau 16 8.8 Mexico City 
7 29.1 Santo Domingo 17 8.6 Almaty 
8 17.7 San José 18 8.4 Montevideo 
9 17.2 Port of Spain 19 6.7 Tirana 
10 16.5 Bogotá 20 6.1 Nairobi 
Source: UNODC (2013). 
Not highlighted by these global trends are cities where the inconsistencies of national crime 
records prevent global comparisons. One glaring omission in this regard is Karachi, Pakistan, 
where ‘killings’ (not specifically defined as homicides) have dramatically increased over the 
past decade, and at the same time have come to be concentrated in a handful of 
neighbourhoods. In absolute numbers of killings, Karachi rates among the most dangerous 
cities in the world (Hashim 2012). 
Table 3.6 Number of killings in Karachi, 2005–2012 
Year Killings 
2005 130 
2006 278 
2007 344 
2008 777 
2009 801 
2010 1,339 
2011 1,724 
2012 2,174 
Source: Gayer (2014). 
Another aspect not captured in the global comparisons of the highest homicide rates, are 
emerging situations like that of India, where 43,355 intentional homicides were recorded in 
2012 at a rate of 4.5 per 100,000 people (Gupte and Muggah 2015). This is more than four 
times the rate of the United Kingdom. Owing to the scale of unregistered births and deaths 
and the poor quality of police data collection, it is likely that the prevalence is much higher. 
Even assuming this conservative count, criminal violence generates at least ten times more 
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deaths and injuries in India than terrorism and conflict. In this, a comparatively small number 
of intermediate and large cities register a disproportionate amount of gun violence: four of the 
top five most violent cities in terms of murder by firearms are located in Uttar Pradesh.3 The 
most violent cities are not mega-cities, but rather mid-sized cities of between 1 million and 3 
million people. These mid-sized cities continue to grow rapidly and feature disproportionately 
large populations of unemployed and under-educated youth. They are also exhibiting 
severely under-resourced services, including public police forces. 
While current data make it difficult to directly compare gender-based violence (GBV) in urban 
and rural areas, there are recognisable linkages between the processes of urbanisation and 
GBV. As McIlwaine argues: 
…on the one hand, cities provide women with greater opportunities to cope with 
violence more effectively in relation to tolerance, access to economic resources and 
institutional support. Yet on the other hand, social relations can be more fragmented, 
which can lead to greater incidence of violence as can the pressures of urban living, 
such as poverty, engagement in certain types of occupation, poor quality living 
conditions and the physical configuration of urban areas. Ultimately, cities themselves 
do not generate gender-based violence, and opportunities for reducing it can be 
enhanced in urban areas. 
(McIlwaine 2013: 65) 
  
                                               
3 Interview with Rajan Medhekar, Director Gender (Retd.), National Security Guard, India. 
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4 Cityscapes now 
Detailed case study material from Mumbai and Rio de Janeiro, two contemporary global 
cities, was developed for this study, to provide a grounding of what violence and order look 
like in cities today. The case studies are summarised in the two sub-sections below, and the 
material broadly covers: 
a. historical trajectories and processes that shape the urban form 
b. contemporary regime-centric approaches to security provision 
c. contemporary citizen-led approaches to security provision. 
4.1 Mumbai 
The city of Mumbai experienced one of the worst bouts of rioting in contemporary India, 
which lasted from December 1992 through to January 1993 (henceforth ‘Mumbai Riots’), and 
the neighbourhoods of south-central Mumbai experienced a particularly high intensity of 
violence. These neighbourhoods provide critical insights into how outcomes of 
violence and order in a contemporary mega-city are both inter-related and path-
dependant. 
The neighbourhoods are best described in terms of mixed power situations (as in Kalyvas, 
Shapiro and Masoud 2008), where the boundaries between what is legal, legitimate or 
credible, and illegal, illegitimate or invalid, are often blurred. As a result, the taxonomy of 
security provision is far more complex than what is traditionally described in patron–client 
models of city governance. In particular, the nature of urban form, when understood in a 
relational rather than an isolative sense, appears to influence not only how security is 
delivered, but as a consequence also influences by whom and to whom it is delivered. As 
such, space is indeed central to several local political processes (Brenner 2004), but the 
lingering legacies of violence in impoverished urban spaces have impacts that reach further, 
as they also redefine the accepted parameters of adequate urban living. 
The manner in which the state sees, relates to and categorises impoverished 
neighbourhoods is closely linked with its understanding of urban citizenship, and as a 
consequence, what it considers to be adequate living standards (Zérah 2009). This 
understanding of urban spaces based on their spatial and material parameters alone 
functions overtly ‘to impose order and… legitimate control by establishing clear-cut 
boundaries between the legal and non-legal’ (Chatterji and Mehta 2007: 129). By defining 
these boundaries, the state distinguishes between urban citizens, who are seen as 
legitimately possessing rights to which the state is accountable, and the ‘population’ (as 
characterised by Chatterjee 2004) which is a vague and heterogeneous grouping without 
legitimate claims on state provision. 
The neighbourhoods of south-central Mumbai (erstwhile Bombay) are some of the oldest in 
the city (Chadha 2005). Today, the neighbourhoods of Nagpada, Madanpura, Agripada, 
Kamathipura, Dongri and Phydhonie can be described as busy inner-city neighbourhoods 
with an equal mix of residential and commercial buildings. Residents are predominantly 
Muslim, with Hindus and other minorities making up approximately 30 per cent of the 
population (Census of India 2011). There are a variety of businesses based in the localities, 
ranging from heavy metal and frame works, to tile shops, tailoring and leather works. The 
area is also home to Mumbai’s longest-standing red light district (Shah 2006). The 
neighbourhoods are mostly populated by chawls (concretised tenement blocks, typically 
made of sub-standard design and materials), some of which are inhabited by a mixed 
population of Hindus and Muslims. These ‘mixed’ chawls tend to be the most sensitive areas 
and have seen frequent instances of civil violence such as rioting and arson. 
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4.1.1 History of Nagpada and surrounding neighbourhoods 
Despite the dilapidated living conditions in these neighbourhoods, throughout the early 
twentieth century they continued to attract wealthier and more established workers because 
of their proximity to the mills. In recent decades however, the area has become a 
predominantly low-income area. Following the Mumbai Riots, there was a steady exodus of 
business-owning Hindu families from the area, coupled with an inflow of poorer Muslim 
households who were being persecuted in other localities (as described in Masselos 2007: 
176), leading to the further ghetto-isation of Nagpada and the surrounding neighbourhoods. 
Recent government and civil society interventions have relocated shanties and pavement 
dwellers to sites on the periphery of the city. 
Under the banner of neighbourhoods somehow ‘unified by Muslims’, as one official in the 
Greater Mumbai Municipal Corporation characterised the area, facts and myths serve to 
glorify and stigmatise the neighbourhoods alike. Inasmuch as the bazaar and street-food 
vendors along Mohammad Ali Road are venerated for their uniqueness, the back-street 
chawls and dense residential areas of Nagpada are stigmatised as being backward and 
disconnected from the more affluent, and Hindu, neighbourhoods in the vicinity. An elevated 
viaduct that runs above the entire length of the Mohammad Ali Road was completed in 2002, 
allowing thoroughfare traffic an uninterrupted run to the affluent neighbourhoods in Fort and 
onwards to Colaba in South Mumbai, by-passing nearly all inner-city neighbourhoods. At the 
time of its construction, the flyover was heralded not only as an ingenious solution to 
Mumbai’s traffic, but also celebrated as a symbol of urban ingenuity as it stood to be the 
longest viaduct in India. 
Much less attention was given to those neighbourhoods that fell under the shadow of the 
giant concrete structure. The increased media attention given to the opening of the flyover 
depicted the neighbourhoods below as homogeneous, dark and congested places. In an 
interview, an assistant commissioner of police attempted to convince us of his expertise on 
Nagpada, saying: ‘I visit Nagpada daily, I live in the eastern suburbs so have to take the 
flyover every day to get to the Commissioner’s Office [at Crawford Market, at the Southern 
end of the flyover]’. The implication was that just by looking down on these neighbourhoods 
from the flyover it was possible to understand these ‘social black holes’ (as in Appadurai 
2000). The reality is quite different. The neighbourhoods which come under the flyover, 
namely Phydhonie, Null Bazaar, Mandvi, Chakla, Bhendi Bazaar, Dongri, Umarkhadi, 
Nagpada and Madanpura, are ‘some of Mumbai’s most historic, economically vibrant, and 
culturally distinct neighborhoods’ (Khan 2007, 2008: 325). This vibrancy is a direct reflection 
of the many different Muslim communities that still populate the area, including Shia, Sunni, 
Deobandhi, Barelvi, Konkani, Bohra and Memon communities,4 as well as a variety of Muslim 
sects including the Aga Khanis and Ishana Asharis (Khan and Ghadially 2009). 
Prodigious and seemingly haphazard growth of the built environment characterised 
Mumbai’s inner-city neighbourhoods in the early twentieth century. There were paddy fields 
and buffalo grazing grounds within a few miles of expensive real estate, while some sections 
of the city were completely crammed with buildings. The diversity in the various loci of power 
and authority flourished greatly at the local level in the near-complete absence of any 
consistent, sustained and city-wide urban planning. 
Policing these newly industrialised neighbourhoods entailed many challenges. Not only were 
the demands of crime detection and prevention increasing rapidly, ‘the chief problem [for the 
police] was the proper housing of the police force, in a city where overcrowding and 
insanitation had become a public scandal’ (Edwardes 1923: 76). It was not only the lack of a 
consolidated urban plan for these neighbourhoods that led there to be such a high density of 
                                               
4 As per regional gazetteers and surveys dating as far back as 1871, more than 15 different categories of ‘Muslims’ lived in 
Mumbai (erstwhile Bombay) (Waterfield 1875). 
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building; this was also due to the adverse effects of a peculiar interpretation of tenurial 
conditions. 
Nevertheless, the overcrowding of chawls of Nagpada and surrounding neighbourhoods 
cannot be understood simply in terms of maximised rent extraction strategies. In the longer 
term, this strategy also had a deep impact upon the social make-up of the communities that 
inhabited the crowded chawls. As the Rent Enquiry Committee of 19395 found, self-selection 
was fast creating segregated ghettos. The cramped living arrangements caused there to be a 
reluctance of ‘the respectable to live with the rough, the skilled to live with the unskilled, the 
jobbers to live with ordinary workers and various castes to live with each other’ 
(Chandavarkar 1981). 
By the late 1950s, the overcrowding of tenants reached a peak while land rents continued to 
rise. This caused builders to opt for the cheapest building materials and often disregard 
building regulations. Cheap timber frames were used for multi-storied structures, and 
inadequate waterproofing6 meant that these rotted at an alarming rate. Critically, builders 
also attempted to lower initial building costs by constructing on poorly built foundations and 
unstable plinths. As Klein (1986) describes, this had a knock-on effect on the drainage 
systems, which could not be cleaned due to the congestion of houses and quickly became 
wholly non-functional. So many buildings were built on inadequate foundations that 
excavation of the pavements to fix the drainage below would almost certainly cause the 
buildings to crumble. Nagpada was left to become one of the many ‘cesspools’ in the city 
where sewage from broken or clogged drains seeped into the sub-soil (Klein 1986: 742). This 
was also when the Rent Act, meant to protect the interests of low-rent tenants by maintaining 
subsidised rent levels, inadvertently put residents in a situation of greater risk and 
uncertainty. 
4.1.2 Violence and order during the Mumbai Riots 
During the Mumbai Riots, there were approximately 900 fatalities, and extensive damage to 
properties and businesses (Masselos 1994). The characteristics of the urban spaces where 
the violence unfolded contributed to the nature and extent of vulnerabilities that local 
residents faced. The effect was two-fold – insecure living arrangements heightened the 
impacts of violence on the one hand, while on the other, it was the flexibility inherent in these 
informal and extra-legal arrangements (such as local vigilante-style patrols) that enabled the 
most accessible and credible form of security. Notwithstanding the temporary nature of these 
security arrangements, lasting in some instances only for a few days, their impact was far-
reaching, with entire households migrating across the city to relocate into neighbourhoods 
where they might benefit from them. These processes also reshaped how safety and security 
are conceptualised by local residents, leading to a shift in the present understanding of urban 
depravation. 
Official records provide detailed accounts of innocent bystanders, standing mostly in the 
tenement balconies above the streets, being shot by police bullets. For example, during the 
afternoon of 8 December 1992, an inspector from the Nagpada Police Station fired at a 
group of 100 to 120 rioting people who, purportedly, were stone-pelting the Bohri (Muslim) 
chawl, but instead he injured a two-year-old Muslim child standing in a balcony above (see 
Srikrishna 1998: II/22.14–17). Several other instances occurred in Nagpada throughout 7 
and 8 December where the police response was questionable, either because of the 
excessive use of force or the apparent partisan nature of the response. When asked about 
these shootings, a key informant in the Mumbai Police said: 
                                               
5 Report of the Rent Enquiry Committee, Government of Bombay, 1939, Volumes I, II & III. 
6 In the roofing as well as surrounding the washing spaces inside. 
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the [constabulary] receive next to no urban-specific training. How to control riots in 
the city is different from how it is dealt with in rural areas… For one, you cannot shoot 
warning shots upwards, there are people up above as well! Same issue with tear gas 
for example – in small lanes where is there space to shoot? Can you shoot around 
corners? In 1992 the situation was also very different, the police were also feeling 
trapped. 
In contrast, local vigilante groups found they were able to traverse the lanes and by-lanes 
with enough ease to continue their patrols. Several respondents recounted the feeling of 
security this provided local residents – they felt protected from the ‘marauding Hindu mobs’ 
as well as the partisan police. It is interesting to note that even though these patrols were a 
fleeting and almost ‘ephemeral’ display of vigilante activity (as in Hansen 2005), which all but 
ceased after a few days, the actions had long-term impacts. Locally, the vigilantes were 
referred to as the khadem-ul-quam akhirhuum, implying they were the last of the ‘real men’ 
doing service to the community. 
4.2 Rio de Janeiro 
There exists an image of the favela of Rio as a source of violence and disorder. There exists 
another image – the favela as the locus of art, music and ‘Brazil-ness’. Both images contain 
elements of truth, but who beholds or owns these truths? Who defines the order and 
disorder? How does the label ‘disorder’ contribute to exclusion from citizenship? In the case 
of urban security and political, economic and social relations, the definition of order emerges 
substantively from the eye of the beholder, mediated by race, class, ‘youth’, as well as 
through perceptions of ‘threats’. 
‘Security’ and ‘insecurity’ are sometimes understood as describing two different urban 
contexts, as if cities or even neighbourhoods were either ‘secure’ or ‘insecure’. ‘Everyday 
insecurity’ begins with the specific negatives of violence and unsafe spaces, but further 
points towards the importance of assessing how wider forms of insecurity – such as lack of 
livelihoods, insecure land tenure or poor services – also frame people’s life experiences and 
perspectives. 
The forms of everyday fragility represent how urban areas can contain spaces that are 
relatively secure and those that are highly insecure. Cities are formed of a complex web of 
different spatial relations that are dynamic and not fixed, these spaces may overlap for 
different groups, in different locations, or in different economic, social or political contexts. 
Rio has had a long history of exclusion based on space, class and in some specific ways, 
race – notably in the ‘favelas’. In popular terminology, the favela is the morro (hill) and the 
modern or safe city is the asfalto (paved road). For much of the twentieth century, different 
favelas were both the locus for poor immigrants from rural areas or smaller towns and a 
space of struggle for ‘control’ through different urban clearance efforts by elements of the 
state. 
4.2.1 Security for whom? 
In the case of Rio, how issues of insecurity are framed and by whom are part of the 
discussion. There are, for example, currently competing narratives over the ‘control’ or ‘order’ 
of the favelas and the relative ‘new policing’ of the UPP (Unidades de Polícia 
Pacificadora/Pacifying Police Units), which began a favela-by-favela strategy of clearance 
and then occupation in 2008. 
Not surprisingly, people live completely different lives within the same city. Exclusion is 
rooted in a complex stratification of society that governmental agencies have not adequately 
addressed. It becomes manifested in social stigma, economic informality, and political 
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marginalisation. Defining Rio as a ‘divided’ city or one with ‘no go’ zones produces a static 
and aspatial analysis, as the boundaries between state and non-state are fluid over time and 
depend on specific interests. How much, then, were the favelas cut off because of the 
criminal presence and how much did the rest of Rio cut them off? 
Different understandings of ‘order’ in the favelas after 1980 took shape due to the roles of the 
state, local community groups and different criminal networks. In some favelas, and in some 
periods, order existed in the relationship between specific criminal organisations and the 
community, frequently including the Residents’ Association, and sometimes, local politicians 
and local police. From a state perspective, and from the view of some residents: order must 
be connected to the overall reduction in everyday insecurities. This includes the reduction in 
the power of criminal networks, the discipline of police in regards to the use of (lethal) force, 
and the opening up of social space for residents to engage in a range of daily activities. 
Order involves trust in the state and the state’s institutions, as well as the functioning 
of the institutions in a transparent and accountable manner. Order may be absent in part 
because the social, spatial and political marginalisation of Rio’s slums has led to what has 
been termed ‘local government voids’ further leading to a crisis of governance, trust and 
inclusion. Local government voids emerge when there exists a conjunction of different forms 
of everyday insecurity: basic services, police protection and political attention disappear or 
require bribes or favours. The clientelism, corruption and its resultant disappointment and 
discontentment among citizens of these communities tend to increase the complexities of the 
local government voids. When these voids exist for long enough, other power-holders or 
power-seekers will step in opportunistically. In the 1980s, the expansion of the global drug 
trade through globalisation and the growing local government voids in marginalised areas, 
coincided to create a favourable scenario for the expansion of different criminal networks in 
specific favelas. 
What emerges as particularly interesting in the case of Rio involves the timing of the growth 
of the criminal networks that coincided with the return to democracy in the 1980s. Thus, there 
were important connections between insecurities and criminals and politics, as part of the 
overall positive process of democratisation. For many of the favelas, the return to more 
competitive electoral politics did not establish strong state actors who could fill the 
governance void. 
Violence and crime may contribute to the lack of access to services, and to further 
weakening social cohesion and trust. Most poor people live at a physical and social distance 
from formal NGOs or government agencies. Thus, when they face pressures from crime and 
violence, which affects access to schools and livelihoods, they may not have any formal 
systems of support or help. In addition, gender-related violence includes not only household 
violence but threats that prevent access to sanitation and water services. For young people, 
the key elements of the transition to adulthood are often truncated by the experience of or 
exposure to violence and crime. 
When violence becomes accepted as part of everyday life and is viewed as a legitimate 
means of resolving conflict, this is described as the normalisation of violence. When it 
becomes a means adopted by the state and citizens alike, it could be called democratisation 
of violence. This is clearly the case in Rio, a city that has seen some of the highest homicide 
rates by firearms in the world. The ‘thin red line’ between order and disorder is fluid and 
‘insecurity’ is a highly localised concept. At the street level, in particular, it is block-by-block 
and neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood, but often for the politicians and the media narratives, 
it is much easier to paint vivid colours across a wide map. 
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Political parties and local government provide order through policing, the provision of 
services and the allocation of tenure/security, but they also create disorder through the 
militarisation of policing as well as covert and sometimes fairly overt connections with 
criminal networks. 
In December 2008, the government launched a new attempt at controlling crime and bringing 
favelas back under state control. This involved setting up a permanent police presence 
initially in some favelas through the UPP. Newly hired and trained police staffed the UPP, 
which explicitly did not have the elimination of all drug trade as one of its mandates. The 
initial list of favelas ‘taken over’ by the UPP forces were those that had relevance for the 
2016 Olympics, again highlighting the political nature of policing. 
The effectiveness of the UPP and other interventions against crime and violence necessarily 
varies from neighbourhood to neighbourhood. Arias (2004) studied three favelas and found 
significant differences in the roots of order/disorder, the roles of the formal Residents’ 
Associations, and the actions of criminal networks. Similarly, the different interventions under 
the UPP had distinct results that require a better understanding of the internal dynamics of 
different favelas, local politics and the particular criminal networks. As the World Bank report 
noted, ‘Perceptions about UPP appear to be influenced by the history that each favela had 
with drug traffickers and the police before the arrival of the UPP’ (World Bank 2012: 14). 
At a fundamental level, the divergent views point to the difficulty of creating an agreed upon 
and inclusive urban citizenship. The notion of citizenship within a democracy refers not only 
to the right to vote, but ‘citizenship now implies a broader set of rights to participate and voice 
opinions in political contests at all levels, benefit from transparency and accountability in 
decision making, and enjoy freedom from unjustified abuse by the authorities’ (Perlman 
2005: 13). For the people living in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas, these rights of citizenship are 
usurped by the criminal violence of drug traffickers and the structural and physical violence of 
the state, resulting in an authoritarian and repressive state within a state. 
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5 Foresighting cityscapes 2040 
5.1 Drivers of change 
The cityscapes were set in the 2040s, giving a 25-year time horizon. This time period was 
chosen to reflect commonly used high-level planning horizons (in the United Kingdom) and to 
go sufficiently beyond the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 20307 timeline so as 
to complement but not get completely diverted by the current debate. In addition, a 25-year 
time horizon is tangible enough for the participants to grapple with and relate to, yet far 
enough into the future for change to be quite dramatic. 
Using a STEEP – social, technological, economic, environmental and political – framework, 
the opening session generated input on the key global trends and external forces driving 
change and impacting our societies, environments and cities. Five participants were invited 
to share short presentations identifying between three and five key trends or external forces 
that, from their perspective, are driving changes in violence and order now, or are emerging 
as drivers of future change. The workshop facilitators recorded and mapped the drivers onto 
a wallchart depicting the city, its transactional environment and the external forces affecting 
the core (see Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1 The STEEP framework overlaid onto the city and its wider 
environment 
 
Source: Diagram developed for the workshop by Fran Seballos and Alun Rhydderch. 
Drivers of change identified by the group of experts at the CVO futures workshop were 
mapped according to the STEEP framework and according to the environment from which 
the driver emerged – external, transactional or from the city itself. Due to the specialist nature 
of the experts’ interventions, a plenary session was facilitated to explore drivers beyond the 
                                               
7 For more details, see: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld. 
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city context, which may affect how individuals, organisations, institutions and cities function 
and interact in the future. 
The list was by no means meant to be exhaustive, but served as a platform on which the 
following futures thinking could be based. Populating the wallchart as described allowed the 
rapid clustering of drivers under broader headings. The process generated nine broad 
clusters of ‘drivers of change’ (shown below): 
1. Population dynamics: How ‘youth’ engage with cities and urban spaces in relation to, 
for example, economic migration, innovation, or illegality; shifting household 
arrangements – composition and location; ageing populations. 
2. Authoritative control of urban space: Controlled or passive response to urbanisation; 
physical infrastructure generating division; fragmentation of cities; militarisation of 
domestic policing and order; the threat of conflict impacting city design; survivors of 
violence in cities. 
3. Changing meaning of cities and urban living: Anti-urban movement; meaning ‘in’ 
cities and meaning ‘of’ cities; persistent patriarchy; politics of language and culture; 
the ‘maturing city’ – slower growth rates; decline of/circumventing of city economies; 
cities as engines of growth; within-city and intra-city inequality. 
4. Environment and resource scarcity: Climate change; water availability; resource 
degradation; mega-disasters. 
5. Changing economies: Networks of cities; economy based on knowledge and services 
(rather than manufacturing); increasing production and consumption (of particular 
commodities/goods/services); the ‘informal sector’. 
6. Movement (flows) of people: Internal and international migration; ‘arrival cities’; 
conflict, development and disaster-induced displacement; rural–urban and urban–
rural flows. 
7. Technological innovation: Unknown (and disruptive) technological innovations; 
(equal) access to safe design and technology; information technology impacts; 
robotics; new technology for energy, transport, building materials; time and space for 
living/work/play. 
8. Complexity of governance structures: Dispersal of order, security between actors; 
complex institutional fluidity; political threats to urban governance and rights; extent of 
decentralisation (‘charter cities’?); regulation and oversight of financial markets; ability 
to regulate the built environment; shifting roles of state, market and civil society; 
authoritarian models of development; shifting alliances between state and non-state; 
allocation of financing. 
9. Political economy of land, (illegal) commodities and services: Elite interests in land 
control; increasingly organised (decentralised?) narcotics trade; provision and control 
of services and resources at city level; privatisation/informalisation of economy and 
land; privatisation/informalisation of services and infrastructure. 
5.2 Visualising drivers of change as slider-scales 
The nine clusters were then visualised as ‘slider-scales’. In conceptualising these slider-
scales, care was taken so as to not reduce any one to a simplistic value judgement – i.e. 
‘good’ versus ‘bad’ or ‘positive’ versus ‘negative’. Instead, the ends of each scale signified a 
nuanced calibration (to maximum or zero effect) of the drivers of change within that cluster of 
drivers of change. 
Two scales for the Technological Innovations cluster were conceptualised: (1) ranging from 
being predominantly linear and incremental in nature, to being rapid and disruptive; and (2) 
as being reliant on increasingly virtual interactions to being reliant on interactions through 
physical contact. These are visually represented as follows: 
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Linear/incremental 
change 
Technological change
 
Rapid/disruptive 
change 
And: 
 
Increasingly virtual 
interaction 
Technology and social interactions
 
Interactions through 
physical contact 
The scale for the Changing Economies cluster was envisaged as ranging from a global 
economy in recession, to it sustaining growth: 
 
Recession 
Global economy 
 
Growth 
The scale for the Complexity of Governance Structures cluster was envisaged as ranging 
from dispersed political power, to situations where political power is predominantly 
centralised: 
 
Dispersed 
Political power 
 
Centralised 
The scale for the Population Dynamics cluster was envisaged as ranging from differentiated 
demographic change to rapid (but not differentiated) population growth: 
 
Differentiated 
Demographic change
 
Rapid population 
growth 
The scale for the Political Economy of Land, Commodities and Services cluster was 
envisaged as ranging from service provision in cities that is inclusive to service provisioning 
that is exclusionary: 
 
Inclusive 
Access to services 
 
Exclusionary 
The scale for the Changing Meaning of Cities and Urban Living cluster was envisaged as 
ranging from thriving to static (and possibly in decline): 
 
Thriving 
Meanings of the city 
 
Static/maturing/ 
possibly in decline 
The scale for the Environment and Resource Scarcity cluster was envisaged as ranging from 
low or mild impacts of climate change, to extreme and frequent impacts: 
 
Low/mild impacts 
Climate change 
 
Extreme/frequent 
impacts 
These slider-scales were not meant to be exhaustive in their descriptive potential, nor were 
they conceived of as a limiting set of factors impacting future outcomes. They are reflective 
of the specific Foresight methodologies used in this study. In the following sub-section, we 
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describe how potential future scenarios can be developed by shifting the slider-scales to get 
a combination of drivers of change that collectively describe the future cityscape. 
5.3 Generating cityscapes 
From these eight slider-scales, each of four groups was allowed to select between two and 
four spectrums to provide a framework for their future cityscape. This was a departure from 
the usual process of scenario development that is premised on the selection of two ‘high 
impact: high uncertainty’ scales which are overlaid to create a quadrant giving four potential 
scenarios. 
In building the cityscape frameworks, the groups had to identify which end of the scale would 
be shaping the city, and in order to avoid group bias, they had to select one driver and use 
the opposite end of the spectrum to that which they intuitively felt would be more likely. This 
rule was instigated to stop the groups building cityscapes that were overly influenced by their 
preconceptions of what a future city may look like, and to ensure that a range of future 
possibilities was fully explored. 
Groups were then referred to the ‘three dimensions of urban form’ – grid, ephemerality and 
governance (as detailed in Section 2) – as a point of reference for describing and articulating 
the interactions and dynamics between the STEEP drivers, as framed by each group’s 
chosen spectrum extremes. To help visualise the cityscapes, each group was encouraged to 
either select a known city, or name and locate their city – for example, a coastal city in 
southern Asia. For this workshop, this provided important context for considering issues such 
as the availability of land for expansion, or the types of climate impacts that may be 
experienced – for example, sea-level rise. 
Once the cityscape narratives were fleshed out, the groups were also asked to consider the 
impact of three kinds of unmitigated and exogenous shocks and stresses on the interactions 
and dynamics between the actors, spaces and institutions, i.e. the worst case within the 
context of their cityscape. The shocks and stresses were: 
S1. Everyday insecurities – this includes those insecurities and vulnerabilities which do 
not threaten the state per se but nevertheless form the everyday lived experiences of 
city-dwellers. These arise from (the threat of) crime, violence or injuries, economic 
insecurity (poverty, unemployment), and/or the gendered, racialised and religious 
structures that maintain unequal social hierarchies. 
S2. Violence, uprisings and armed conflict – this includes protracted conflicts that are 
increasingly located in and around cities, or even if they are not, often have the 
control of cities as their objective. 
S3. Climate change and disasters – this includes the many small disasters, i.e. fires, 
landslides, local floods, waste flows, not just the headline ones. 
Thinking through the unmitigated impact of such shocks and stresses led to the identification 
of weaknesses in the cityscapes’ systems, institutions and interactions – or conversely to 
their strengths. Considering both the weaknesses and strengths, each cityscape group then 
took up the challenge of designing interventions – policy or programmatic – that would 
mitigate (in the case of weaknesses) or ensure management of (in the case of strengths) the 
shocks and stresses identified. The workshop generated a number of proposals that could be 
implemented, or worked towards in the near term to build, safer, more resilient cities of the 
future. 
Please note that the following cityscapes were not written to a specific structure other than 
the particular calibration on the chosen slider-scales. The write-up of each cityscape is 
therefore reflective of each individual group’s decision-making process, and to a lesser 
degree the choices of the designated note-takers. In terms of process, allowing this flexibility 
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saved on coordination time, which was instead devoted to plenary discussions on policy 
responses and implications, without detracting from the overall purpose of the exercise. 
5.4 Cityscape 2040: ‘Coastal collapse’ 
 
Linear/incremental change 
Technological change
 
Rapid/disruptive change 
Increasingly virtual interaction 
Technology and social interactions
 
Interactions through 
physical contact 
Recession 
Global economy
 
Growth 
Dispersed 
Political power
 
Centralised 
Differentiated 
Demographic change
 
Rapid population growth 
Inclusive 
Access to services
 
Exclusionary 
Thriving 
Meanings of the city
 
Static/maturing/ 
possibly in decline 
Low/mild impacts 
Climate change
 
Extreme/frequent impacts 
[Notes provided by Dr Roger Williamson, IDS] 
A coastal Chinese city with a population of 10 million and a broader urban region of 20 
million making a poly-centric, export-dominated, special economic zone. In 2015, it was still a 
successful exporter of ‘white goods’ – for example, fridges, washing machines, microwaves 
and other manufactured goods to the European and North American markets. It had 
developed very fast from 1995 to 2015, but by 2040 there were serious signs of strain on the 
economic and social model on which the city’s development and prosperity had depended. 
The city is located on the coast – there is a river and at the coast there is a container port 
(which was modern in 2015, but has fallen on harder times with the decline in export 
demand). Rapid expansion to the megalopolis of 30 million people was rapid and not 
physically constrained (for instance, no mountains close to the coast). The main constraints 
were therefore the ‘workableness’ of the urban region – distance, traffic, commuting times 
and so on. Given that the city was located on the flood plain with a low-lying river delta, 
flooding and sea-level rise have been greater challenges. 
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The three slider-scales used to create this cityscape were positioned as follows: 
 
Recession 
Global economy
 
Growth 
Description: By 2040, there was a general and local recession caused by a shift in large-
scale manufacturing out of China. There was still limited demand for the type of goods 
produced in the Chinese market as the middle class had developed (2015–35) but for the 
last five years (2035–40) even here demand slowed. Much of the basic manufacture and 
assembly for these goods was now done in other Asian and African countries. This was in 
line with the relocation of manufacturing industry as predicted by Chinese economist Justin 
Lin (2011). Chinese labour costs rose and the Chinese economy developed – as many had 
predicted, and in line with Chinese government policy – in the direction of a consumer-based 
and service economy. 
Some of the entrepreneurial and managerial staff were able to emigrate and work in Africa in 
supervisory, planning, IT and managerial posts for the kind of firms which had been 
producing previously in the city region. In a return flow of migration, some foreign traders and 
a few people with specialist skills came from abroad to live and work in the city. 
There are a lot fewer formal sector jobs. In rural areas, the informal development has been 
accepted. The situation is less clear-cut in the cities. 
 
Dispersed 
Political power
 
Centralised 
Description: By 2040, the Chinese political system had evolved, but not fundamentally 
altered. The Chinese Communist Party was still in control, but the difficulties in the economy 
and previous experience with the devolution of some decision-making autonomy to city level 
meant that (successful) local experiments were welcomed. Unsuccessful experiments 
adversely affected career chances for local officials and managers – leading in extreme 
cases to disgrace, demotion and/or relocation. But so did continued inadequate economic 
performance in the city and signs of public discontent. Citizens’ interest groups could 
organise around local issues of service delivery, economic performance, and issues such as 
the efficiency and cleanliness of the city, housing etc. They did not have to be under Party 
control but were still not allowed to challenge the system or threaten its ‘stability’ (order) as 
defined by the Party. To do so could trigger direct reprisals and police intervention – even 
with force – for example, clearing streets by police action if a demonstration ‘got out of hand’. 
The coordinated pressure for better services on the one hand, and the comprehensive use of 
electronic surveillance technologies on the other, mean that there is now permanent potential 
for conflict. There is a danger that the middle class may become more insistent that the state 
should ‘get a grip’ and impose more order. 
 
Linear/incremental change 
Technological change
 
Rapid/disruptive change 
Description: The period 2025–2035 revolutionised the industrial base of the city. 
Computerised, robotised and fully automated production processes replaced the need for 
less skilled labour working in assembly for instance. The manufacturing process was mainly 
centred on carbon compounds and new materials, not metal. 3D printing largely replaced the 
need for transport of components and assembly. Finished items were much smaller and 
lighter. In many cases software transfer meant that customers could have their items locally 
produced in ‘3D print warehouses’. This meant that the large factory buildings were mainly 
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standing idle – but some were adapted to other uses – broken up into small units used for 
product design, such as 3D print shops of various kinds and centres for manufacturing green 
energy technologies. 
The new technology inevitably meant that there were winners and losers – the main losers 
being lower-skilled workers and those working in transport. 
5.4.1 Implications of drivers of change for demographics 
Various factors need to be mentioned. The end of China’s one-child policy led to families 
having two children on average. Nonetheless, the city had an ageing profile with more and 
more ‘over 70s’ to care for – leading to increasing demand for health facilities and 
public/community transport and social services. The increase in the numbers of children also 
led to pressure on school places. Unemployment and retraining needs also meant that there 
was a greater demand for courses alongside a growing dissatisfaction that these ‘do not lead 
anywhere’. 
There is a division between a growing middle class and first- and second-generation 
migrants who live in worse-quality housing and crowded conditions behind inadequate flood 
defences (which often fail or are overwhelmed). These are mainly near factories and the port 
where air quality has been bad, but is now improving as heavy industry declines. Many of 
those who have recently come to the city still leave their children with grandparents (in 
practice mainly grandmothers) to be cared for and educated in the villages from which they 
came. Many older workers do not want to return to their villages when their working life ends. 
They have grown accustomed to the urban existence and, in spite of nostalgic memories, are 
aware of the more limited opportunities in their places of origin. 
The general recession means that even if people wanted to move, their job prospects would 
not necessarily be better elsewhere – particularly for the lower-skilled workers. Those who 
have arrived from the countryside and do not have full legal and residential rights under the 
hukou system,8 still are determined to stay in the city, as they feel their prospects would 
probably be worse if they returned to the countryside. They are discontent and are organising 
themselves to demand more rights. The authorities at city and national levels keep promising 
that they will be gradually granted more rights and their situation will be improved by a 
process of ‘controlled integration’, but resourcing and organising this process is increasingly 
difficult under recession conditions. 
5.4.2 Implications of drivers of change for gender dimensions 
The loss of factory jobs has disproportionately affected women, who have been most likely to 
become unemployed. Where they have kept their jobs, there has been a downward pressure 
on wages. With the ageing population and inadequate state/municipal provision of services, 
women are being pushed to take an even greater, unpaid caring role. Some younger men 
are prepared to share caring roles, but older men (and some women) accept or actively 
promote a more traditional division of roles within the family. 
5.4.3 Implications of drivers of change for new industries 
Some attempts at urban renewal have been made, with a refurbishment of the city centre – 
but this has mainly been in the richer areas. Refits of old buildings, particularly equipping 
high-rise offices and dwellings with solar energy, has provided some jobs and transformed 
the use of some factory space. More people are employed in some sense or other as 
guards/night-watch men and women, and in staffing and analysing the increased surveillance 
data. 
                                               
8 Hukuo is the system of household registration required by law in China and Taiwan. 
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5.4.4 Wider implications 
At municipal level, and from the organisations representing residents and workers, various 
scenarios have been elaborated for future visions for the city. These include ‘municipal 
quantitative easing’ – i.e. an appeal made to central government to support or allow deficit 
spending to transform the old ‘hollowed out’ industrial architecture, factories and workers’ 
housing. The government is reluctant to underwrite or to allow this. Local entrepreneurs are 
actively seeking to promote ‘city marketing’ – promoting the city as a place with a future – but 
so far have few successes to show. In any case, many other cities have similar, competing 
initiatives. 
The informal economy is growing. Local street vendors are becoming more organised and 
pressing for improvements to their lot – an end to petty harassment and fines for technical 
and minor infringements, an undercover market to improve their working conditions and 
subsidised ‘lock ups’ or garages to store their goods securely overnight. There has been no 
considered response at policy level to these appeals. There is a general perception from all 
sides that the current arrangements are ‘not really working’ and the police engage in periodic 
crackdowns to show that they are ‘doing something’ – taking it out on the street traders and 
justifying this as a campaign against petty crime and pickpockets. 
5.4.5 Sources of increased tension and potential violence 
1. Everyday insecurities. There has been an increase in petty criminality. 
2. Violence and armed conflict. Some of the disadvantaged and disaffected have 
organised themselves, with the development of gangs and fears that these may 
become armed groups. This alarmist rhetoric has been condemned but still persists in 
some circles and is used to justify calls for a ‘crackdown on criminal elements’. 
Citizens’ groups are trying to fill the gap left by the inadequate state provision and 
loss of jobs. They fear that the unemployed, some of whom are living as squatters in 
deserted buildings, may be oppressed. One initiative is to negotiate to try to avoid the 
criminalisation of those who cannot pay for housing – or their forced expulsion from 
the city. 
3. Climate change. Sea-level rise and the backing-up of river water has led to a week 
of major flooding – a smaller version of the New Orleans floods. Much of the poorer 
area of the city is under water. Flood defences for that part of the city near the port 
have proved completely inadequate. On the other side of the river, the flood defences 
have held, but many of the middle class families have abandoned the flats and 
squatters have moved in. The city has not been able to cope with the flooding and 
citizens’ organisations have coordinated a response, trying to organise alternative 
sources of clean water, and (without authorisation) trying to clear and repair drains, 
provide sandbags for shops and houses and so on. Some people from outside the 
flooded areas have joined the initiative. 
5.4.6 What might be the policy response to increased tensions and violence 
in this cityscape? 
1. Social movement-led revival. The strong citizen response to the floods, coupled 
with a more responsive attitude by the authorities, creates new possibilities of 
a stronger coalition between the authorities and the wider population. The 
poorer sections of the population insist on no evictions and no victimisation for those 
involved in activism – particularly the squatters’ movement. The ‘No empty space’ 
movement is a citizen-led coalition campaigning for any empty housing to be made 
available and for factory space to be used at advantageous rates for business, 
community groups, self-help training initiatives and so on. The community is also 
providing labour at subsistence wages to build up the sea defences to provide a new 
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protective barrier for the poorer residential areas. The city is providing the rocks and 
cement to make this possible. Street vendors’ organisations succeed in their 
campaign for a more progressive policy and indoor space for regularisation of their 
status. A liaison group between the traders and the city and police negotiates a 
resolution of almost all areas of friction in a tolerable and mutually acceptable way. 
2. Muddling through. The precarious stand-off between the authorities and certain 
sections of the population continues. Occasional victimisation of prominent 
activists, such as leaders of the street vendors or squatters, continues. Periodic 
‘crackdowns’ lead to confrontation between police and local youth – sometimes with 
violence and counter-violence. Groups do not achieve any wider solidarity, each 
group has to ‘fight its own corner’ – leading to contestation over services and mistrust 
and competitiveness between different initiatives. There is some voluntary work and 
patchy philanthropic initiatives. The port is still functioning, but is of diminishing 
economic importance. Within the wider city area (the 30-million conurbation) some 
new small enterprises emerge and some ‘urban farm’ ventures develop on a small-
scale cooperative model. 
3. Further decline. The downward spiral continues. The ‘Chinese Detroit’ scenario 
threatens. City finances are non-viable – the city is effectively bankrupt and the state 
is not keen to bail it out or provide a rescue package. Policing and services are – step 
by step, without a deliberate policy or announcement – gradually withdrawn from the 
poor areas. The poorer sections of the population are left to fend for themselves and 
these areas of the city become effectively ‘no go’ areas for officials and outsiders from 
the residential areas which are not so hard hit. 
5.4.7 Potential policy approaches and external involvement 
● The city could be open to approaches from international networks of cities and Asian 
(and other) international disaster-preparedness networks for policy advice and 
options. 
● They might welcome help in drawing up risk assessments and identifying the weakest 
points such as for additional infrastructure protection. 
● Their ‘Green Economic Strategy’ might involve a commitment to decrease the carbon 
footprint and increase the use of renewable and low-energy options. 
● Smart technologies and decentralised citizens’ initiatives using social media will likely 
provide an early warning system for sea-level rise. 
● Predictive technology is also used at a much higher level (city/coastal region). 
● The assumption is made that answers need to be ‘home grown’ and use the 
experimental flexibility in the Chinese system as it develops. 
● The scientific/technical side was assumed to be strong but an exchange at BRICS 
level9 – particularly with the Brazilians – is used to strengthen the ‘social 
movement/citizens’ participation’ side of the response. 
  
                                               
9 That is, the five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
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5.5 Cityscape 2040: ‘Solar saviour’ 
 
Linear/incremental change 
Technological change
 
Rapid/disruptive change 
Increasingly virtual interaction 
Technology and social interactions
 
Interactions through 
physical contact 
Recession 
Global economy
 
Growth 
Dispersed 
Political power
 
Centralised 
Differentiated 
Demographic change
 
Rapid population growth 
Inclusive 
Access to services
 
Exclusionary 
Thriving 
Meanings of the city
 
Static/maturing/ 
possibly in decline 
Low/mild impacts 
Climate change
 
Extreme/frequent impacts 
[Notes provided by Thea Shahrokh, IDS] 
This cityscape is built from a basic starting point of the city of Bosaso, a secondary city 
located on the coast of north-eastern Somalia. 
● It serves as the region’s commercial capital and is a major seaport within the 
autonomous Puntland state. It is described as a ‘city state’. 
● The ethnic or clan-based make-up of the city is diverse as a result of the civil war, 
however the population is majority Muslim. 
● The post-civil war population increased from 500,000, and now reached 2 million as a 
result of economic development, including inward migration. 
The slider-scales used to develop this cityscape were as follows: 
5.5.1 Extreme climatic conditions 
 
Low/mild impacts 
Climate change
 
Extreme/frequent impacts 
With a hot desert climate, the city suffers from extreme water shortages with 19mm of rain a 
year. There are no controls for flooding so unexpected weather changes that bring large 
quantities of rain would have a huge impact on the city. There has been a recent move 
towards tree planting, however there are challenges to sustaining this. Sea-level rise also 
poses a threat to the city, which is 50m above sea level. 
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5.5.2 Meanings of the city 
 
Thriving 
Meanings of the city
 
Static/maturing/ 
possibly in decline 
Its position as a major port has enabled a strong platform for investment in technology. 
Economic relations with China were established stemming from its port status and this has 
led to investment in technological innovation. The city has become a major hub for IT and 
technological innovation, particularly in the field of solar energy. Recent exponential growth 
has further strengthened and stabilised the city economy. Particular advances in solar power 
have connected into the city’s position as a port and solar ships are making major advances 
in clean transportation and trade. Economic migrants from Afghanistan and Yemen as ‘guest 
workers’ make up a large proportion of the industrial workers in the solar and shipping 
industry. This has expanded to include Greek labour as historical links have re-opened. 
However, the social and political reality of the city is contested. The post-civil war context has 
meant that there are tensions along clan-based or ethnic lines within the city’s population, as 
citizens were displaced into this urban setting. Economic development and technological 
innovation over the last 15 years have seen a move away from illegality and piracy as a 
major economic pathway. Muslim Sharia law has maintained strength and is constituted. 
Young people who have benefited greatly from economic prosperity see themselves as 
better than the jobs in the shipping and industrial sectors and are therefore disaffected. 
There is an economic migrant population from Afghanistan and Yemen drawn in by the 
shipping trade. However, since they are brought in on short-term contracts, there is no 
livelihood security, leading to dejected migrant workers. There are also issues of integration 
and social cohesion as ethnic tensions are present among migrant workers, and also 
between them and the Somali population. A major issue is that although there is economic 
progression, the context is socially regressive: oppressive norms that subordinate women 
and people in marginalised groups remain. Women and minority ethnic groups are excluded 
from the labour force. A strong patriarchal gender order remains in place. 
5.5.3 Technology 
 
Linear/incremental change 
Technological change
 
Rapid/disruptive change 
The country has experienced growth in the technology sector with investment in innovation 
from China. However, these innovations are rapid in some areas, like solar power, but 
hampered in others, primarily by the geo-politics present in relationships with multinational 
corporations. The Department of Chinese Studies has opened up cultural links with China 
and Chinese youth. 
Eco-friendly innovations in spatial design are wide-ranging and deeply influential. For 
example, passive systems determine tree-planting, there are cafés to encourage 
participation in leisure growing, and systems to harness solar energy are integrated into the 
mobility infrastructure for personal vehicles. Building regulations are now opening up – a new 
satellite town has been built. However, public transportation systems and services continue 
to be plagued with inefficiencies and are not maintained. 
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5.5.4 Governance 
 
Dispersed 
Political power
 
Centralised 
Following 20 years of established democracy, the national political climate is described as an 
authoritarian clan-based ‘community of elders’ type of government. There are increasing 
moves towards creating a city state, led by the city’s liberal municipal mayor. The city 
benefits from continued economic stability and good trade relations with China, indicative of 
continued growth. A respected community of elders maintains continuity with 
traditional/cultural norms. Economic growth is driven largely by the ports, and these remain 
under central government control. There is an aggressive system regulating migrant workers. 
Services and infrastructure are controlled through government investments. Modern free 
trade zones have been established, and incentives provided for financial services to set up 
trade. 
5.5.5 Sources of increased tension and potential violence 
1. Everyday insecurities: 
a. Disaffected youth and dejected migrant workers initiate competing armed 
waves of neo-piracy – the connection to regional terrorist networks and arms 
trades is particularly dangerous. 
b. Threat of this growing into drugs trading networks related to the shipping 
routes; a drug like Khat is consumed fresh so not a major risk in terms of 
exports – but imports could be. 
c. Violence against women becomes ‘invisible’ in the face of economic 
progress/modernity yet remains present in private and public spaces. 
d. Persistent gender inequalities, and inequalities for marginalised groups. 
2. Violence and armed conflict: 
a. Perceived/real ‘threat’ to the power of the city state government by 
neighbouring states with alternative clan-leadership may lead to a repressive 
(military response). 
b. If the city state government evolves into a repressive regime then there is a 
threat of violence and conflict on multiple fronts. 
c. Attempted coup by an oil company (geo-politics) – led to the Bosaso 
government privately contracting the Chinese army to respond to this. 
3. Climate change/disasters: 
a. Intense heat/sun levels affect agriculture and water. This is an intensely water-
insecure area. 
b. However, this climate is also what has enabled the innovative response 
through the technology of the Bosaso government, which is generating 
income for the country. 
c. Major food supplies are imported however, which is very expensive for the 
majority of the population. 
5.5.6 What might be the policy response to increased tensions and violence 
in this cityscape? 
Impetus will need to come from a progressive mayor to nurture community and collective life 
in order to build resilience. ‘Guilds’ based on livelihoods/occupations will need to provide 
alternative spaces of association outside clan-based ethnic lines, which are driving ongoing 
tensions. Incentives for participation could initially come through tax credits. This would draw 
in migrant workers and include women. An annual festival celebrating the identity of these 
groups could help new cultures to grow. Establishing economic and political links through an 
economic alliance with China could enable the incumbent political power to solidify its 
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position and prevent a coup – the mayor of Bosaso could foster this through visits to China 
for cultural and political relationship-building. 
However, concern might arise regarding the dependency on China and the extent to which 
the continued fulfilment of human rights and a participatory democracy would be constrained 
given this relationship. Building alternative relationships with other countries/regional bodies 
would therefore be important to maintain international accountability. 
Youth employment and business opportunities that are initiated from the perspectives of 
young people enable them to provide their own pathways. Social networking and internet 
culture enable alternative spaces for youth culture to emerge, including cultural exchange. A 
Women’s Department of Film Studies could be established at the university to enable women 
to raise voices and share their ideas and imaginations. 
A programme of gender and empowerment including ensuring girls and young women are 
fully participating in secondary level education would be critical to address longer-term 
gender inequalities. 
There is a state-wide campaign to promote modern ways of being and to discredit piracy, 
offering a new future for the country – a form of public shaming of the idea of piracy. 
Freedom of press to report on piracy is established. This drive is complemented by 
international pressure on establishing norms against piracy. Meaningful engagements within 
the state diaspora are made possible through the state economic development agency, and 
enable the exchange of knowledge, ideas and monetary resources. 
5.6 Cityscape 2040: ‘Post-capital commons’ 
 
Linear/incremental change 
Technological change
 
Rapid/disruptive change 
Increasingly virtual interaction 
Technology and social interactions
 
Interactions through 
physical contact 
Recession 
Global economy
 
Growth 
Dispersed 
Political power
 
Centralised 
Differentiated 
Demographic change
 
Rapid population growth 
Inclusive 
Access to services
 
Exclusionary 
Thriving 
Meanings of the city
 
Static/maturing/ 
possibly in decline 
Low/mild impacts 
Climate change
 
Extreme/frequent impacts 
[Notes provided by Eric Kasper, IDS] 
This cityscape was built using a contemporary non-coastal Indian city as a starting point. The 
slider-scales along which the city in 2040 was assessed were as follows: 
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5.6.1 Climate change 
 
Low/mild impacts 
Climate change
 
Extreme/frequent impacts 
Climate variability is thought to be highly disruptive, with serious conditions of flooding and 
high levels of out-of-season rainfall interspersed with heat stresses getting more frequent 
and intense with time. However, as the city itself is not coastal, the climate-related shocks 
and stresses are perceived as ‘happening elsewhere’. As a result, risk management is not 
highly systematised across the city. Most efforts towards building resilience are mainstream 
and ‘off-the-shelf’ approaches. There are no indications that dedicated resources for risk 
management are being set aside. Food supply vulnerability has set in nationally. 
5.6.2 Population 
 
Differentiated 
Demographic change
 
Rapid population growth 
The population can be described by extreme demographic differentiation and accompanied 
by a reduction in family sizes. A change in gender dynamics is perceptively evident with 
women more likely to work, given the need for dual incomes across most households. 
Smaller family units also imply fewer elderly parents are able to live in the same home – this 
marked transformation in domestic space is significantly different from rural settings, where 
larger households are more common. 
5.6.3 Implications of drivers of change for technology 
 
Linear/incremental change 
Technological change
 
Rapid/disruptive change 
The city is envisaged as being shaped by new technologies that are disruptive to the status 
quo. In particular, 3D printing technologies have rapidly developed and revolutionised two 
sectors. Firstly, new building technologies have replaced bricks and mortar with 3D printed 
materials. The technology has become widespread through middle- and upper-income 
neighbourhoods, where residents have been able to readily afford the expensive raw 
materials required to switch to this technology. Low-income neighbourhoods continue to use 
low-grade non-permanent materials. The regulatory environment has been unable to cope 
with the ‘democratisation’ of building technology, and this has inevitably led to a greater 
degree of non-conformity with building regulations. Recent government efforts have been 
aimed at regulating the design files, while building regulations need to be enforced through 
code inspectors. 
Second, small arms manufacturing has switched almost completely to using 3D printing. The 
open-source nature of the design files has led to widespread gun ownership among civilians 
in all walks of life. Control of ammunition is one of few remaining state controls of firearm 
use. 
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5.6.4 Implications of drivers of change for the global economy 
 
Recession 
Global economy
 
Growth 
The dollar has all but collapsed and the Chinese have demanded repayment of their debt. As 
a result, a new Bretton Woods system has emerged that sets up a global consensus that the 
reconstruction of spaces and economies is in the collective interest, and directs money 
towards such efforts. Though cities become less important, this however does not 
exacerbate intra-urban inequalities. A group of global leaders articulate a different way of 
generating and allocating resources that ‘ensure the public good’ across countries and 
across cities. 
5.6.5 Sources of increased tensions and violence 
There is a central authority that regulates, but it is not integrated in its response to climate 
change and use of donor funding. Climate change in nearby coastal cities has led to 
increased inward migration, while other social impacts of climate change are seen indirectly 
in the city. 
Since the city is not coastal, it has not been forced to be very organised in dealing with 
climate change. However, the post-disaster scenario in neighbouring coastal cities has 
created a large influx of internally displaced persons. The wealthier ‘refugees’ are able to 
enter the city and find space for relocation. The poorer arrivals cannot do this. People start to 
demand citizenship (e-passports) based on original city of habitation. 
As city populations grow, they become more differentiated. Social differences become 
magnified. The fragmentation of population growth has been the result of alternate views of 
family sizes propagated by a popular wave of anti-religious sentiments. Although there are 
the same number of people in the city, there are now twice as many households. The 
widespread availability of 3D-printed building materials implies that the number of 3D-printed 
houses now vastly outnumber the basic service delivery points (like water, gas, electricity 
and sanitation) needed to service these households. This has created a growing feeling of 
resentment across both the consumers and providers of basic services. 
Further tensions are likely as not everyone can afford to buy 3D-printed materials for 
building. Large sections of the city are getting left behind. For the middle class and upwards, 
there is uptake of 3D printing of homes, which is hugely resource-intensive. Others, who are 
excluded from this, use 3D printing to print arms. 
A major disease outbreak occurs. It starts in dense populations in South Asia and spreads 
through the city. The unexpected thing is, it does not wipe out the poor, but goes through the 
piped water system and wipes out differentially the elite (more educated, skilled and wealthy) 
sections of society who are more likely to be connected to the infected water supply. 
There is an exogenous increase in everyday insecurities. A few neighbourhoods face a spate 
of racialised arrests. This becomes all the more problematic as the city is not particularly 
integrated in its responses. New elites are emerging – those who control the internet, those 
who control 3D printing. 
The city becomes dependent on 3D-printable concrete as a building material. This radically 
changes the architectural possibilities and reshapes the city – potentially into low-rise 
housing. The urban form leads to consequences for daily life. This further develops the 
hyper-localisation of society. 
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5.6.6 What might be the policy response to increased tensions and violence 
in this cityscape? 
The nature of governance structures in the city imply that the burden of risk management 
cannot be placed on any one single scale, but is spread across local and national actors. 
Investing in a strong evidence base early is important, as is the need to empower 
communities with access to this evidence. Substantial resources need to be diverted towards 
re-imagining the conceptual frameworks used to understand ‘refugees’ and ‘internally 
displaced’. As people get displaced from one city and seek refuge in another, city-based 
citizenship becomes a contested topic that requires support from research funding. 
Technology regulation systems are key to maintaining order and control, however there are 
differential impacts across the city. Innovators in design and usage of new materials are 
thought leaders and key influencers – so development interventions need to focus on 
including them in the process of change. Gender dimensions continue to be central, not only 
for the differential impact of violence, but also due to the gendered nature of the relationships 
people have with technological innovations. Interventions therefore need to focus on creating 
space for both women and men to be leading innovators. 
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6 Confronting the challenges of tomorrow in 
cities of today: Biases and blind spots in 
current policies, programmes and processes 
Following the workshop, consultations were conducted with a range of experts, stakeholders, 
donors and practitioners. In light of the policy challenges highlighted through the future 
cityscapes, in our consultations we posed a series of inter-related questions: 
● How do they currently understand and act upon the relationships between 
urbanisation and peace processes? 
● What is the nature of the relations between urbanisation, urban violence, urban fault 
lines, and the national and sub-national peace processes and what are ways of 
assessing future fragility trends? 
● What is the nature of the urban political settlement and how does it affect the sub-
national and national peace processes? 
● How do citizens currently negotiate for services or economic benefits in different 
urban contexts? How do ‘pirate’ or self-service cities provide opportunities for 
transitions out of fragility in non-traditional ways? 
The table below summarises our findings relating to the nature of large donor-funded 
research programmes that are ongoing or have been completed within the last five years. 
Table 6.1 Focus of current/recent programmes relating to cities, violence 
and order 
Framing concept Links with ‘violence and order’ framework 
Resilience Concept largely not city-specific; borrowed from other related fields 
and therefore potential to leave particular gaps in policy and 
programming; frequently considered separately from power, 
poverty, governance and violence issues 
Fragility Fragile city terminology is somewhat dominated by its links with 
‘feral cities’; capacities, particularly of citizen-led innovations are 
not highlighted to the extent they should be; there is the risk of a 
dystopian, ‘ain’t it awful’ view that misses on the diversity and ‘up 
from the pavement’ initiatives that reflect citizen engagement 
Safety Crime, violence and justice have been separate intellectual and 
programme domains from violence. When there has been attention 
to violence, especially in urban areas, it is usually in relation to 
‘violent extremism’ or gender-based violence 
For the latter, this has been central to getting the issue of gender-
based violence on international forums; but there is a continued 
disconnect with on-the-ground/day-to-day policing – how a crime is 
policed, how it is reported and our understanding of jurisprudence 
Infrastructure development Relatively well funded, but the links between violence and order 
are disparate  
6.1 Blind spots 
We report below a list of blind spots identified through expert consultations: 
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1. Non-state actors as providers of security: The state is not the sole provider of 
security in cities. This not only presents complexities in terms of how research and 
programming are carried out, but also raises ethical and moral questions. How does 
one think about non-state providers of security, particularly those that may also 
engage in illicit or criminal practices, as agents of change within broader 
conversations around the Sustainable Development Goals, for instance? We need to 
reconcile the need for the rule of law on the one hand, with a plethora of actors (both 
state and non-state) who are likely to be involved in providing security on the other; 
which of these actors will drive and sustain the rule of law? Just as ‘idle youth’ or ‘new 
entrants’ to cities are maligned as groups that might perpetrate violence, they are 
also victims of it, and for some, violence can be a route to identity and voice. 
2. Framing of security: How people define and describe their own sense of security 
and insecurity could be better incorporated into the framing. There continues to be 
space to think about what security means, who delivers it, and whether it should be a 
public or private (i.e. excludable) good? 
3. Rapidly growing small towns: More than half of the urban population currently live 
in small towns of fewer than 500,000 people. Some of these towns are slated to grow 
into large cities in the near future. While some of these growing agglomerations, such 
as Juba (South Sudan) or Buenaventura (Colombia), already feature in the research 
agendas on violence and order, others such as Lubango (Angola), Herat 
(Afghanistan), Pokhara (Nepal) or Muzaffarpur (India), however, continue to be 
relatively hidden from view. 
4. Learning from the safest cities: There is a growing amount of evidence on 
innovations leading to violence prevention located in cities where violence is 
prevalent, but much less is known about the dynamics of security provision in cities 
where violence is less prevalent (Osaka, Singapore, Tehran, Jakarta for example). 
This includes evidence on other, more hidden, forms of vulnerabilities, oppression 
and marginalisation that nevertheless take place in locations wherein physical 
violence might not be as prevalent. 
5. Planning and design: Provision of affordable housing in the cities of the developing 
world continues to be driven by out-dated approaches. Lessons from failures of public 
housing projects such as Pruitt-Igoe, a failed housing project in St. Louis, Missouri, 
which was eventually demolished (see Hall 2014), seem to have been largely 
forgotten, or are ignored; just as urban planning treats cities as building blocks for 
grand schemes (‘Seeing Like a State’), so the lessons of how spatial and temporal 
relations function are treated as marginal points of view. This is at odds with an 
agenda towards building safe, inclusive and sustainable cities. 
6. Technology: There are several promising innovations, but relatively sparse attention 
given to up-scaling technology-based innovations. Aside from a handful of notable 
exceptions,10 the police are missing from the conversation on finding, trialling and up-
scaling technology-based innovations that are not militaristic in nature. There is much 
attention on ‘smart cities’ but not on people-centred technologies. 
7. Police reform: The core agenda of police reform does not have any significant urban 
or city focus to speak of, and there are frequent internal obstacles within bilateral 
donor agencies over whether and how to engage with the police. This is despite very 
significant concerns being raised over police capacities, resources and willingness 
with city police forces. Emerging evidence is hinting at overworked, debilitated and 
disgruntled police forces providing security in cities – this calls for the need to train 
research agendas on police wellbeing and functioning. 
                                               
10 Including, the Mobile-Based Smart Policing Project (www.igarape.org.br/en/smart-policing), the Virtual Police Station 
(www.virtualpolice.in) and the Mobile Training Platform for Urban Police (www.ids.ac.uk/project/a-mobile-training-platform-for-
urban-policing-in-india-and-nepal). 
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6.2 Implications for policy, practice and research 
We find that there is a continuing need for donors to invest in more evidence-gathering and 
to undertake more detailed research on the interplay between violence and order in cities. In 
particular, we find that: 
● This includes maintaining focus on different typologies of violence. Violence 
might occur ‘on cities’ (as in cities coming under siege). But it might also occur ‘within 
cities’ (where violence is located in urban settings, but almost by circumstance), or it 
may be ‘inherent to cities’ (where the type and modalities of violence are specifically 
urban in nature; and even become ingrained in the everyday fabric of urban life). The 
three levels are deeply interconnected (through cross-cutting themes of gender, for 
instance), but they present significantly different challenges in terms of entry points 
for violence mitigation strategies. 
● ‘Ordered cities’ are often synonymised with ‘planned’, ‘smart’, or even ‘charter’ cities. 
Misconceived planning, policy, or design interventions are likely to create insecurity, 
not reduce it. Urban order can also be repressive and exclusionary, and these 
processes can occur over very long periods of time. As such, ‘order for whom?’ is the 
operative question that significantly impacts outcomes. In this sense, there is a critical 
gap in our understanding of the lessons that the safest cities provide us in terms of 
systems thinking – as opposed to violence preventing innovations in unsafe cities. 
● Both national and local governments, as well as donors and other stakeholders, need 
to rethink their tools and analytical frameworks to assess whether the lived 
experiences of urban violence are being adequately taken into account. This 
should also extend to research, policy design and programme implementation. 
● More attention and resources are necessary within each agency and with partners on 
different aspects of urban research, including improving data collection on 
violence and order in cities, particularly for informal settlements. Data on urban 
areas is very limited: sometimes even basic information such as up-to-date population 
numbers or spatial planning and zoning information for informal settlements is 
missing. There is continued reliance on sub-standard crime statistics that are often 
not available at the local level. When local-level crime statistics are available, they 
often suffer from a lack of temporal consistency of reporting as well as the methods 
used for particular statistics. Quality of data is also severely hampered by 
inconsistencies in the processes of officially registering violent crime, evidenced by 
the discrepancies between statistics presented in official records and those presented 
by human rights watch groups. Programming based on sub-standard data is not 
likely to succeed. 
● Tracking performance at a sub-national level and across a number of 
categories and new dimensions will require a significant and sustained effort. 
Work could continue on specifying targets and indicators for new dimensions included 
in the post-2015 proposals that are relevant for the urban poor, not least access to 
land and decent housing, among others. 
● Using ‘foresighting’ to help identify urban futures that are possible, probable 
and preferable. As heuristic tools, these future scenario-planning approaches are 
useful in helping to assess the nature of future challenges, and the types of policy 
response, both today and in the future, that these might necessitate. 
6.3 Concluding thoughts 
The futures thinking presented in this study is relevant for mega-cities such as Mumbai and 
Rio de Janeiro, as they continue to change, but importantly also for smaller towns and cities 
that are projected to host more than 500,000 residents, particularly in fragile and conflict-
affected countries. In either setting, experience shows that an approach to ‘get the economy 
right first’, or even focusing too much on national institutions of government, without giving 
attention to local government, might create social and political fissures and create violence in 
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cities. Institutional conditions and governance arrangements are such that they tend to 
exacerbate processes of marginalisation, unless that is, issues of inclusion are explicitly 
placed on the table. 
In terms of violence mitigation, there are tangible differences between ‘political settlements’ 
and ‘peace processes’ – in many ways, the former is static and non-transformative, while the 
latter is more geared towards the fluid future of cities. As we have noted, crime and violence 
statistics are useful proxy indicators of everyday violence and fragility in cities because they 
represent social stress, failures of state systems/legitimacy, and may create deeper 
processes beyond specific numbers (i.e. fear of taking certain bus lines, visiting certain 
neighbourhoods, or mistrust of other ethnic, religious and political groups). 
But everyday violence and fragility also goes beyond simple statistics of violence to include 
the ungoverned or non-state governed spaces that they can represent. It also includes the 
destabilising factors that urban pressure can bring to national politics, and the positive 
element that this might have on forcing greater accountability on political elites. One 
commentator refers to ‘pirate’ cities in regards to how citizens have created their own service 
systems, while another has referred to the ‘self-service’ state.11 Both reflect the ways in 
which governance failures have an impact on local communities. The complex nature of the 
overlap between urban and national fragility is, however, a pressing issue at a national and 
international scale as well. 
  
                                               
11 Garth Myers, written communication. 
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